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8.1 Introduction
8.1.1 Local authorities and size of the local government in Italy
In the Italian legal order the local authorities (‘enti locali’, lit. ‘local entities’) 
are the Municipalities, the Provinces, the Metropolitan Cities, the Mountain 
Communities, the Island Communities, and the Unions of Municipalities. 
The ‘fundamental’ local authorities are the Municipalities and the Provinces. 
Their ‘fundamental’ character fi nds its justifi cation in historical reasons and 
in the fact that all ‘other’ local authorities are related to Municipalities 
and Provinces; the Union of Municipalities, the Mountain Communities, and 
the Island Communities result from a union of Municipalities; whilst the 
Metropolitan Cities should replace the Provinces in the exercise of their 
administrative functions (however, the Metropolitan Cities, instituted in 
1990, have not been implemented, and for this reason they will not be 
analysed in this chapter).
It is useful to report some data relating to the number and size of Italian 
local authorities.1 The Municipalities are about 8,000,2 whilst the Provinces 
are 107. It is rather diffi cult to advise as to the exact number of the ‘other’ 
local authorities (Mountain Communities, Island Communities, and Union of 
Municipalities), however, from a 2008 legislative bill it emerges that at the 
time there were 365 Mountain Communities.3
 1  See L. Vandelli, Il Sistema delle autonomie locali, Bologna, 2007, p. 86. See also the web site 
of the Union of the Italian Provinces http://www.upinet.it/upinet/province.bfr and of the 
National Association of the Italian Municipalities http://www.anci.it/.
 2  The exact fi gure is diffi cult to determine. Indeed, the number of the Italian Municipalities 
is subject to frequent change. This is due to the creation of new Municipalities resulting 
from a ‘merger’ of two or more pre-existing Municipalities (see infra section 8.7).
 3  See the introduction to legislative bill No. 73, entitled ‘Law on the mountain’, submitted to 
the Presidency of the Italian Senate on 29 April 2008. The document can be consulted at 
http://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/frame.jsp?tipodoc=Ddlpres&leg=16&id=404032. 
From this source it also emerges that the Mountain Communities group together over 4,000 
Municipalities whose territory is entirely or partly mountain. This fi gure is quite impressive 
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Provinces have an average size of 563,000 inhabitants, the largest being the 
Province of Milan (c. 3,700,000), and the smallest being the Province of 
Isernia (less than 90,000). One can see that the largest Province has a 
population which is 41 times the size of the smallest.
The heterogeneity amongst Municipalities is even greater. The average size 
is about 7,250 inhabitants. The largest Municipality is Rome (c. 2,600,000), 
whilst the smallest Municipalities (with about 30 inhabitants) are located in 
Lombardy (according to the 2001 census, the smallest Italian Municipality is 
Morterone, in Lombardy, with 33 inhabitants). The largest Municipality 
(Rome) has a population which is about 87,000 times the size of the population 
of the smallest Municipalities. It also needs to be pointed out that the number 
of Municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants is very low (only 636 
Municipalities out of 8,000). This distinction (above or below 15,000 inhabit-
ants) is important as some special rules on the election of the Mayor apply to 
Municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants (see infra section 8.5.6.).
The following analysis of Italian local authorities will focus on Municipali-
ties and Provinces, as the ‘other’ local authorities do not have real ‘own’ 
autonomy; indeed, they result from a ‘union’ of Municipalities and Provinces.
8.1.2 History of local government in Italy
The ‘fundamental’ local authorities (that is, Municipalities and Provinces) 
have an ancient origin.4 The Municipality is endowed with an autonomy 
which is ‘original’, as it can be traced back to prior to the formation of the 
Italian State. In other terms, the Municipality as an institution was not 
‘created’ by the State authority, but is a spontaneous result of social realities.5
The Province is endowed with autonomy; however, it does not have ‘original 
autonomy’. Indeed, it was ‘created’ by State authority, in accordance with the 
French model of the Department, as established by Napoleon Bonaparte.6
Since Municipalities are very ancient, it is diffi cult to identify their date of 
foundation.7 In contrast, the Provinces of the Italian State have an offi cial ‘date 
of birth’, as they were established by Law No. 2248 of 1865 (known as ‘Legge 
if one only thinks that it includes over the half of the Italian Municipalities and about 54 per 
cent of the national territory.
 4  See G. Melis, Storia dell’amministrazione italiana. 1861–1993, Bologna, 1996; S. Cassese, La 
formazione dello Stato amministrativo, Milano, 1974; S. Tarrow, Tra centro e periferia. Il ruolo 
degli amministratori locali in Italia e in Francia, Bologna, il Mulino, 1977; M. S. Giannini 
(ed.), I Comuni. Atti del congresso celebrativo del centenario delle leggi amministrative di unifi cazione, 
Vicenza, 1967; A. Petracchi, Le origini dell’ordinamento comunale e provinciale italiano, Vicenza, 
1962; C. Pavone, Amministrazione centrale e amministrazione periferica. Da Rattazzi a Ricasoli 
(1859–1866), Milano, 1964.
 5  See L. Giovenco and A. Romano, L’ordinamento comunale, Milano, 1994, p. 1.
 6  See G. C. de Martin, Un ente strategico, ancorché misconosciuto: la Provincia, in Federalismi.it 
(www.federalismi.it), published 9 September 2009.
 7  See F. Calasso, Comune (storia), in Enciclopedia del diritto, Vol. VIII, Milano, 1975, pp. 169 ff.
25304_text.indd   184 18/03/2013   08:55
NO
T F
OR
 DI
ST
RIB
UT
IO
N
Italy  185
Rattazzi’ (‘Rattazzi Law’), after the proponent Urbano Rattazzi). This Law pur-
sued the aim of creating an instrument for the ‘administrative decentralisation’ 
of State functions, as well as for the control of the Municipalities by the State.
Legal scholar Giulio Vesperini has recently singled out three stages in the 
historical development of the Italian local authorities (Municipalities and 
Provinces).8 
The fi rst stage begins with the passage of Law No. 2248 of 1865 and ends 
in 1948 with the coming into effect of the Constitution of the Italian Republic. 
This initial stage is characterised by a strong ‘centralistic’ aptitude. The Law 
of 1865 adopted the ‘principle of uniformity’, according to which the local 
authorities were subjected to an identical regulation in the whole national 
territory.9 Such uniformity pursued the aim to endorse the political and social 
cohesion of the ‘newborn’ Italian State, whose unifi cation had been achieved 
only four years before in 1861.
During this period, the local authorities did not have real ‘autonomy’, 
insofar as their powers were ‘delegated’ from the State and local authorities 
were seen as a ‘manifestation’ of the State. The top offi cials of the Municipalities 
and the Provinces were appointed by the State Government; the electoral 
suffrage was restricted to a limited number of local citizens; State bodies were 
entrusted with pervasive control powers over the acts of the local authorities; 
the Prefect (the State representative at local level) had a substantial supervisory 
power over local authorities.
A fi rst signifi cant turning point arose towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, when the offi ce of Mayor and of President of the Province became 
elective. This goes hand in hand with the progressive extension of the 
franchise. However, despite these important developments relating to political 
rights, the actual space for the autonomy of local authorities ended up being 
restricted. This is due to the ‘centralisation’ of some important public services 
traditionally provided at local level.10 Furthermore, the creation of a number 
of ‘Local Offi ces’ of the State (‘Uffi ci Periferici’, lit. ‘Peripheral Offi ces’) 
determined a radical reduction in the competences of local authorities, 
especially to the detriment of the Municipalities.
Giulio Vesperini includes the entire period of the fascist dictatorship 
(1925–1945)11 within the fi rst stage in the history of local authorities. When 
 8  See G. Vesperini, ‘Enti locali’, in S. Cassese (ed.), Dizionario di diritto pubblico, Vol. III, 
Milano, 2006, pp. 213 ff. In relation to the period prior to the Italian Constitution (1948) 
see M. Nigro, Il Governo locale. Storia e problemi, Roma, 1980, pp. 27–43, and L. Vandelli, ‘I 
Comuni e le Province’, in S. Bartole et al., Le autonomie territoriali, Bologna, 1984, 
pp. 217–228.
 9  See F. G. Scoca, ‘La pubblica amministrazione come organizzazione’, in L. Mazzarolli et al. 
(eds), Diritto amministrativo, Bologna, 2001, p. 458 and p. 468. See also U. Allegretti, 
‘Autonomia regionale e unità nazionale’, in Le Regioni, 1995, pp. 9 ff.
10  See G. Vesperini, ‘Enti locali’, cited above f’note 8, p. 2214.
11  In 1925 all political parties (except for the National Fascist Party) were outlawed, and in 
1945 the Italian Social Republic, allied to the Third Reich until the end of the war, was 
dissolved.
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Benito Mussolini established the dictatorship, his authoritarian rule was 
extended to the local level.12 Law No. 237 of 4 February 1926 suppressed the 
main organs of the Municipality (Council, Executive and Mayor) and repealed 
the principle that local offi ces had to be elected and representative. All the 
power within the Municipality was conferred to an individual, the ‘Podestà’ 
(lit. ‘Power’), appointed by Royal Decree. In relation to the Provinces, in 
1923 the offi ce of President of the Provincial Council was abolished and, 
despite initial plans to abolish the Province as an institution, their number 
increased in the following years; in 1927 the number of the Provinces rose 
from 76 to 92.
During the fascist period the Unifi ed Text of the Municipal and Provincial 
Law came into effect (Testo Unico della Legge Comunale e Provinciale, Royal 
Decree No. 383 of 3 March 1934; this act was a ‘consolidation statute’ 
of all the previous laws relating to Municipalities and Provinces). The 
Unifi ed Text (despite a few amendments to make it compliant with the 
republican Constitution) remained in force until the end of the twentieth 
century.
The second stage in the historical development of the local authorities 
began with the entry into force of the republican Constitution of 1948 and 
ended in 1989, when Italy ratifi ed the European Charter of Local Self-
Government (approved in Strasbourg on 15 October 1985). During this stage 
a transition from a ‘centralised’ to a ‘polycentric’ State took place. The ‘prin-
ciple of autonomy’ was included among the fundamental principles of the 
Constitution (Article 5). This principle is the right of the Municipalities and 
Provinces to autonomously determine their own policy objectives. The 
Constitution also instituted the Regions, to which legislative power was 
granted in the subject matters laid down by Article 117. However, the coming 
into effect of the Constitution did not ipso facto determine a transition to a 
‘polycentric’ State due to the lack of implementation of this part of the 
Constitution for a number of years. Indeed, the fi rst signifi cant developments 
for the local authorities took place between the 1970s and the 1990s. The 
most signifi cant episode during this period is the transfer of a considerable 
number of administrative functions to the local authorities (and to the 
Regions) by Decree of the President of Republic No. 616 of 1977.13 
The third stage began in 1989 with the ratifi cation by Italy of the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government and ended with the 2001 constitutional 
reform. After the ratifi cation of the European Charter, a new comprehensive 
law on local authorities was passed (Law No. 142 of 1990). This law provided 
the ‘skeleton’ of the later Unifi ed Text on Local Authorities of 2000 (Testo 
12  See F. Fabrizzi, La Provincia: storia istituzionale dell’ente locale più discusso. Dalla riforma di 
Crispi all’Assemblea costituente, in Federalismi.it (www.federalismi.it), published 18 June 
2008.
13  See E. de Marco, Comune, in Enciclopedia del diritto, Vol. IV (Aggiornamento, ‘update’), 
Milano, 2000, p. 258. 
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Unico degli Enti Locali, a ‘consolidation statute’ of all the previous laws 
relating to local authorities). During the 1990s the Italian Parliament passed 
two acts of paramount importance for the regulation of local authorities; Law 
No. 81 of 1993 and Law No. 59 of 1997. The fi rst act (Law No. 81 of 1993) 
modifi ed the election system of the Municipal and Provincial Councils in 
a way which makes it easier for the winning party (or coalition) to obtain a 
stable majority in the Council. The same act also introduced the direct election 
by voters of the Mayor (head of the Municipality) and of the President of the 
Province (head of the Province). The second act (Law No. 59 of 1997, known 
as ‘Legge sul federalismo amministrativo’, that is, ‘Law on administrative 
federalism’, or also as ‘Legge Bassanini’ (‘Bassanini Law’), after the proponent 
Franco Bassanini) initiated a vast transfer of administrative functions from the 
State to the local authorities. Also, this act introduced the principle of 
subsidiarity in the Italian legal order. The fundamental principle set by the 
Bassanini Law (and by the subsequent Legislative Decree No. 112 of 1998, 
known as ‘Decreto sul federalismo amministrativo’, ‘Decree on Administrative 
Federalism’) is that all administrative functions shall be conferred to the 
Regions and the local authorities with the sole exception of those ‘expressly’ 
reserved for the State. In 2000 the Unifi ed Text on Local Authorities14 
(hereafter TUEL) came into effect. This is still the fundamental legislative act 
on local authorities. In 2001 the part of the Constitution regulating the local 
authorities (Title V, Part II, of the Constitution) was signifi cantly amended in 
order to grant these authorities further autonomy.
8.1.3 The local authorities in the 1948 Constitution
With the entry into force of the 1948 Constitution, Italy became a ‘polycentric’ 
State.15 The ‘polycentric’ nature of the State relies upon the ‘principle of 
autonomy’ (‘principio autonomista’), which enhanced the position of sub-
national authorities (Municipalities, Provinces, Regions). The ‘principle of 
autonomy’ is embodied in Article 5 of the Constitution, according to which: 
The Republic is one and indivisible. It recognises and promotes local 
autonomies, and implements the fullest measure of administrative 
decentralisation in those services which depend on the State. The Republic 
adapts the principles and methods of its legislation to the requirements of 
autonomy and decentralisation.
The ‘principle of autonomy’ grants considerable rights to local authori-
ties. These authorities are the principal addressees of the ‘administrative 
14  The full name is ‘Testo unico delle leggi sull’ordinamento degli enti locali’, approved by 
Legislative Decree No. 267 of 18 August 2000.
15  See M. Olivetti, ‘Lo Stato policentrico delle autonomie’, in T. Groppi and M. Olivetti (eds), 
La Repubblica delle autonomie. Regioni ed enti locali nel nuovo Titolo V, Torino, 2001, pp. 39 ff.
25304_text.indd   187 18/03/2013   08:55
NO
T F
OR
 DI
ST
RIB
UT
IO
N
188 Stefano Villamena
decentralisation’ the State has to put in place. The State has to ‘decentralise’ 
to the greatest possible extent (‘the fullest measure of administrative decentrali-
sation’), that is, has to transfer its administrative functions to the local 
authorities and retain only those functions which cannot be performed at local 
level (for example, those relating to ‘immigration’, ‘foreign affairs’, ‘public 
order’, etc., which are traditionally performed by the State).
The ‘principle of autonomy’ has to be read together with another funda-
mental principle contained in Article 5 of the Constitution; the ‘principle of 
unity’ (‘principio unitario’).16 This principle is embodied in the formula ‘The 
Republic is one and indivisible’ and implies the inviolability of the territorial 
integrity of the State. Accordingly, any initiative promoting the separation of 
a part of the national territory with the aim of declaring it independent from 
Italy is unconstitutional. However, the principle of unity goes beyond the 
prohibition of secession; it also implies that excessive differences between 
the different parts of the national territory are not permitted, as this would be 
in breach of the ‘core content’ of the principle. A detailed analysis of the rela-
tionship between the principle of unity and the principle of autonomy goes 
beyond the scope of the present chapter. What it needs to be pointed out here 
is that the two principles have to be ‘harmonised’; indeed, the principle of 
unity implies a ‘centralisation’ of functions within the State, whilst the 
principle of autonomy implies a ‘decentralisation’ of functions to the benefi t 
of the local authorities. It is therefore required to strike a balance between 
the two principles and more specifi cally between the functions which ‘shall’ 
be retained by the State and the functions which ‘can’ be transferred to the 
local authorities.17 As noted by Giorgio Berti, the relationship between the 
two principles “shall not be translated into a rigid contraposition between 
State apparatus and autonomous entities”.18 Carlo Esposito pointed out that 
decentralisation cannot go as far as infringing the inviolable limit of the ‘indi-
visibility of the Republic’; a different solution would lead to the “death of 
Italy” as a country.19 It is fair to say that achieving equilibrium between 
the two principles is far from easy. This is especially due to the fact that the 
Constitution does not clearly defi ne the content of the principle of autonomy. 
As a consequence, the equilibrium, instead of being determined in accordance 
with the Constitution, is the result of a political decision of the State (that is, 
one of the parties of the ‘deal’).20
16  See F. Modugno, ‘Unità e indivisibilità della Repubblica come principio’, in Diritto e società, 
2011, p. 73 ff.
17  See C. Esposito, ‘Autonomie locali e decentramento amministrativo nell’articolo 5 della 
Costituzione’, in Id., La Costituzione italiana, Saggi, Padova, 1954, p. 71.
18  See G. Berti, ‘Principi fondamentali’ (Article 5), in G. Branca (ed.), Commentario della 
Costituzione, Bologna, 1975, p. 278.
19  See C. Esposito, ‘Autonomie locali e decentramento amministrativo’, cited in f’note 17, p. 72.
20  See F. Manganaro, ‘La storia paradossale della tutela dell’autonomia degli enti locali nella 
giurisprudenza costituzionale’, in G. della Cananea and M. Dugato (eds), Diritto 
amministrativo e Corte costituzionale, Napoli, 2006, p. 209 ff.
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The picture of the legal status of local authorities in the 1948 Constitution 
(until the changes introduced by the aforementioned 2001 constitutional 
reform) was completed by a few detailed provisions. Article 114 of the 
Constitution stipulated that the Republic is sub-divided into “Regions, 
Provinces and Municipalities”. In the light of this provision, the local author-
ities, together with the Regions, were seen as part of the State (or, which is the 
same thing, of the ‘Republic’).
The distribution of legislative and administrative functions formed the 
object of Article 117 and Article 118 of the Constitution. The basic criterion 
for the distribution of the administrative functions was the ‘principle of 
parallelism’. According to this principle, the tier of government (State or 
Regions) that had legislative power on a given subject matter, for example 
‘town-planning’, also had (in principle) the administrative functions related 
to that subject matter. Article 118 allowed for two important exceptions to 
the principle of parallelism to the benefi t of the local authorities. First, the 
State, in fi elds of “exclusive local interest”, had the right to confer administrative 
functions to Municipalities and Provinces. Second, the Regions were required 
to perform their administrative functions by delegating them to Municipalities 
and Provinces, or by using the offi ces of these authorities.21 In reality, the 
Regions, instead of delegating their administrative functions to the local 
authorities, used to keep these functions at regional level.
Article 128 stipulated that “Provinces and Municipalities are autonomous 
entities within the framework of the principles established by general laws of 
the Republic determining their functions”. The fundamental rule that 
emerged from this legal provision was that Provinces and Municipalities were 
‘autonomous entities’. Given that the ‘autonomy’ of the local authorities was 
established directly in the Constitution, this could not be repealed by a State 
law. At the same time Article 128 specifi ed that the autonomy of local 
authorities, even if guaranteed by the Constitution, had to be regulated by 
“general laws of the Republic”, that is, by legislative acts regulating in general 
terms (with no detailed provisions) the organisation and the functions of the 
local authorities. The underlying assumption was that if State laws in this 
matter were too detailed, and not ‘general’, this would have impacted 
negatively on the autonomy of local authorities, as these authorities would 
have been deprived of the freedom to decide on their internal organisation, as 
well as on the performance of their administrative functions. In sum, Article 
128 aimed to establish some degree of uniformity, limited to fundamental 
aspects of the local authorities, without imposing a total uniformity in their 
regulation.
Article 130 of the Constitution regulated the control on the acts of the 
Provinces and of the Municipalities. The power of control was allocated to a 
21  Article 118 of the Constitution. This aspect was reinforced by another constitutional 
provision, Article 129, according to which: “The Provinces and the Municipalities are 
districts for State and regional decentralisation.” 
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regional body, the Regional Control Committee (‘Comitato regionale di 
controllo’ [CORECO]). This body was abolished by the 2001 constitutional 
reform.
The Constitution originally did not grant the local authorities any power of 
taxation. This is another aspect that has been modifi ed by the 2001 
constitutional reform (see further details below at section 8.3.5.).
The illustrated constitutional provisions were a signifi cant progress if 
compared with the situation prior to the entry into force of the Constitution, 
especially from a symbolic point of view, as the local authorities were included 
(together with the Regions) among the entities composing the ‘Republic’ 
(Article 114). However, these provisions failed to establish a considerable role 
for the local authorities in the Italian legal order.22 In their relations with 
‘higher’ tiers of government (State and Regions), the local authorities suffered 
from the absence of a constitutional provision that expressly regulated their 
‘fundamental functions’ and the mechanisms of protection of their autonomy.
The lack of a fully satisfactory constitutional regulation allowed the State 
to act according to the political agenda of the day. As a result, in certain 
historical phases, the autonomy of the local authorities was signifi cantly 
limited, whilst in other phases, the autonomy was expanded (for example, the 
Bassanini Law considerably expanded the powers of local authorities). Such 
‘limitations’ or ‘expansions’ were equally possible because the State laws did 
not fi nd any precise limit in the Constitution.
The described constitutional framework confi rms the words of constitu-
tional scholar Livio Paladin, who wrote that, in relation to local authorities, 
the 1948 Constitution was “a blank page which still needed to be written”.23 
He meant that the ‘empty space’ left by the Constitution had to be fi lled by 
the State legislature. Interestingly, even after the 2001 constitutional reform, 
despite a number of changes to the position of local authorities, there are still 
numerous ‘lacunae’ in the constitutional regulation of these authorities. This 
situation may have a negative effect on the position of local authorities in the 
future.
8.2 The reform of the local government
8.2.1 Law No. 142 of 1990
For many years after the entry into effect of the Constitution, the regulation 
of the local government remained ‘fragmentary’; there was no legislative act 
which regulated local government in a comprehensive and complete way. This 
situation generated confusion and uncertainty; in this fi eld there were a 
22  See F. Manganaro, La storia paradossale della tutela dell’autonomia degli enti locali nella 
giurisprudenza costituzionale, cited f’note 20.
23  See L. Paladin, ‘Problemi legislativi e interpretativi nella defi nizione delle materie di 
competenza regionale’, in Foro amministrativo, 1971, III, p. 39.
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number of legislative acts adopted at different points in time, which were not 
easy to harmonise.24
In 1990, this problem was resolved through the passage of Law No. 142 
entitled ‘Regulation of Local Autonomies’ (‘Ordinamento delle Autonomie 
Locali’). This law is an important milestone in the development of local 
authorities.25 It laid down a comprehensive regulation of the local authorities 
and provided clarity through the ‘consolidation’ of all the previous laws 
on local government. This result was achieved through the repeal of a 
number of legal provisions ‘scattered’ in a number of earlier statutes and 
regulations.26 
Law No. 142 of 1990 granted new powers to the local authorities. An 
important example of these new powers is the right of the local authorities to 
adopt their own ‘constitution’ (‘statuto’, lit. ‘statute’). The local authorities 
were also given the right to call for a referendum for deciding matters of local 
interest.
 Law No. 142 of 1990 was later repealed. In 2000 a new piece of legislation 
replaced it; this is the aforementioned Unifi ed Text on Local Authorities 
(Testo Unico degli Enti Locali, TUEL, a ‘consolidation statute’ of all the 
previous laws relating to local authorities). A large part of the content of Law 
No. 142 is mirrored in the TUEL.27 
8.2.2 The ‘Bassanini reform’ as a ‘foretaste’ 
of the 2001 constitutional reform 
The Bassanini reform is the historical and logical premise to the 2001 consti-
tutional reform.28 Indeed, the cornerstone of the Bassanini reform is the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity, which is also one of cornerstones of the later constitutional 
reform. For this reason, the constitutional reform can be understood only after 
explaining the important legislative reform (known as the Bassanini reform) 
promoted in 1997–1998 by Franco Bassanini, the Minister of Public Service 
of the Centre-Left Government in offi ce at the time.
24  See G. U. Rescigno, Corso di diritto pubblico, Bologna, 1995, pp. 620–621.
25  See G. Vesperini, La legge sulle autonomie locali venti anni dopo, in Rivista trimestrale di 
diritto pubblico, 2010, 4, pp. 953 ff. The author portrays the historical development of the 
local authorities in Italy, highlighting advantages and disadvantages of Law No. 142 of 
1990. 
26  Cf. Art. 64 of Law No. 142 of 1990. Among other acts Law No. 142 of 1990 repealed the 
Unifi ed Text of Municipal and Provincial Law (‘Testo Unico della Legge Comunale e 
Provinciale’, Royal Decree No. 148 of 4 February 1915) and the Unifi ed Text of the 
Municipal and Provincial Law (‘Testo Unico della Legge Comunale e Provinciale’, Royal 
Decree No. 383 of 3 March 1934). 
27  See G. Vesperini, La legge sulle autonomie locali venti anni dopo, cited f’note 26, p. 974.
28  See V. Cerulli Irelli, ‘Consolidamento delle riforme amministrative e innovazioni 
costituzionali: problemi attuativi e di integrazione’, in G. Berti and G. C. De Martin (eds), 
Il sistema amministrativo dopo la riforma del Titolo V della Costituzione, Roma, 2002, p. 19 ff.; 
A. Pajno, ‘L’attuazione del federalismo amministrativo’, in Le Regioni, 2001, p. 667 ff.
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The Bassanini reform of 1997–1998 began with Law No. 59 of 1997,29 that 
delegated to the Government the adoption of a legislative decree for the trans-
fer of administrative functions from the State to the ‘autonomies’ (Regions and 
local authorities). This transfer has been called by legal scholars ‘administra-
tive federalism’,30 given that it was inspired by the principle of subsidiarity, 
which is considered as a typical element of federal systems (for example, of the 
German federal state31). The transfer is called ‘administrative federalism’ also 
because all administrative functions have been transferred to the Regions and 
the local authorities with the sole exception of those listed in Law No. 59 of 
1997, which remained to the State. Indeed, the most important legal mechan-
ism put in place by the Bassanini reform was the creation of a list of subject 
matters, which were reserved for the State and in which the administrative 
functions could not be delegated to the Regions or the local authorities. At 
the same time the Bassanini reform allowed for the transfer to the Regions and 
the local authorities of the administrative functions in all other (that is, ‘non-
enumerated’) subject matters (Article 3 of Law No. 59 of 1997).
The criterion for determining the tier of government to which the 
administrative functions have to be transferred is the ‘optimal level for the 
exercise of a given function’. For this reason subject matters such as ‘foreign 
trade’,32 ‘citizenship’, ‘immigration’,33 ‘scientifi c research’,34 were reserved 
for the competence of the State. The remaining subject matters (and 
the administrative functions attached to these subject matters) were trans-
ferred from the State to a different tier of government (Regions or local 
authorities).35
29  Law No. 59 of 15 March 1997, entitled ‘Delegation of legislative power to the Government 
for the transfer of administrative functions and duties to the Regions and the local 
authorities, for the reform of the Public Service and for the simplifi cation of the 
administration’.
30  The topic of ‘federalism’ has been researched by many Italian legal scholars. See for example 
the seminal work G. Bognetti, ‘Federalismo’, in Digesto delle discipline pubblicistiche, Torino, 
1991, Vol. VI, pp. 273 ff. Less frequently Italian legal scholars looked at the concept of 
‘administrative federalism’. On the latter cf. A. Pajno, L’attuazione del federalismo 
amministrativo, cited f’note 28. See also P. M. Vipiana Perpetua, ‘Osservazioni sul cosidetto 
federalismo amministrativo nella sua evoluzione e nei suoi sviluppi’, in Istituzioni del 
federalismo, 2011, p. 395 ff. 
31  On the German federal system after the constitutional reform of 2006 see C. Panara, Il 
federalismo tedesco della Legge Fondamentale dalla cooperazione alla competizione, Roma, 2008.
32  Art. 3 Lit. a of Law No. 59 of 1997.
33  Art. 3 Lit. f of Law No. 59 of 1997.
34  Art. 3 Lit. p of Law No. 59 of 1997.
35  Not all administrative functions are performed by a tier of government (State, Regions, 
local authorities). Some important administrative functions are exercised by the ‘functional 
autonomies’ (‘autonomie funzionali’). The ‘functional autonomies’ are the Universities, the 
Bank Foundations, the Professional Associations, and the Chambers of Commerce. These 
are autonomous public institutions with specifi c administrative duties. Some of them are 
recognised in the Constitution; for example, the Universities, whilst others, for example 
the Chambers of Commerce, lack constitutional recognition. For further details on this 
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It goes almost without saying that the illustrated criterion (‘optimal level 
for the exercise of a given function’) is closely linked to the principle of 
subsidiarity.36 More specifi cally, Article 4(2) of Law No. 59 of 1997 stipulated 
that the ‘transfers’ of administrative functions have to be put in place according 
to the following guidelines: “. . . the generality of the administrative duties 
and functions [shall be transferred] to the Municipalities, the Provinces and 
the Mountain Communities” in accordance with their “territorial size”, with 
the sole exception of those administrative functions that are “incompatible 
with that size”.
The ‘transfer’ of functions from the State to the Regions and the local 
authorities took place through Legislative Decree No. 112 of 1998,37 which 
also regulated the transfer to the Regions and the local authorities of the 
‘goods’ and the ‘human and fi nancial resources’ required for the adequate 
exercise of the new responsibilities.
It is essential to look at the role of the Regions in transferring 
administrative functions in accordance with the Bassanini reform. In the 
areas falling within the scope of their legislative responsibility, the Regions 
had to transfer part of the administrative functions that the State had 
previously transferred to them to the local authorities. Pursuant to the 
type of authorities see S. Papa, La sussidiarietà alla prova: i poteri sostitutivi nel nuovo ordina-
mento costituzionale, Milano, 2008, pp. 191 ff., and F. Liberati, Le autonomie funzionali quale 
espressione del divenire del pluralismo nell’ordinamento italiano, in Federalismi.it (www.federal-
ismi.it), published on 16 December 2009. See also A. M. Poggi, La autonomie funzionali 
«tra» sussidiarietà verticale e sussidiarietà orizzontale, Milano, 2001, and D., ‘Il riparto costi-
tuzionale delle funzioni amministrative’, in S. Gambino (ed.), Diritto regionale e degli enti 
locali, Milano, 2009, pp. 157–158.
36  See A. Gentilini, ‘La sussidiarietà appartiene al diritto mite? Alla ricerca di un fondamento 
giuridico per l’«attrazione in sussidiarietà»’, in Giurisprudenza costituzionale, 2008, 02, pp. 
1640 ff. The author notes that before 1997 the impact in Italy of the European Charter of 
Local Self-Government had been very limited (despite the fact the Charter had been ratifi ed 
by Italy in 1989). Article 4(3) of the Charter contains a clear reference to the principle of 
subsidiarity: “Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those 
authorities which are closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another authority 
should weigh up the extent and nature of the task and requirements of effi ciency and 
economy.” The reason why this legal provision received so little attention in Italy have been 
identifi ed by S. Cassese, ‘L’aquila e le mosche. Principio di sussidiarietà e diritti 
amministrativi nell’area europea’, in F. Roversi Monaco (ed.), Sussidiarietà e pubbliche 
amministrazioni (Atti del Convegno per il 40º della Spisa. Bologna, 25–26 Settembre 1995), 
Rimini, 1997, p. 83. In this essay Cassese argues that Article 4(3) of the Charter only 
covers the ‘positive’ aspect of subsidiarity (public responsibilities shall generally be 
exercised by those authorities which are closest to the citizen), and not the ‘negative’ aspect 
of the principle, that is, that a tier of government should abstain from exercising a 
responsibility which could be better exercised by a lower tier of government. On this topic 
see also V. Parisio, «Carta europea delle autonomie locali» e principio di sussidiarietà, in 
F. Roversi Monaco (ed.), cited in this f’note, p. 391 ff.
37  Legislative Decree No. 112 of 31 March 1998, entitled ‘Transfer of administrative functions 
and duties of the State to the Regions and the local authorities, in application of Chapter I 
of Law No. 59 of 15 March 1997’.
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principle of subsidiarity, the chief objective of the Bassanini reform was to 
bring the administration as close as possible to the citizens (‘administrative 
subsidiarity’, ‘sussidiarietà amministrativa’). As a result, the Municipalities, 
being the authorities that are closest to the citizens, were expected to 
become the principal benefi ciary of the transfer of administrative functions, 
including those functions currently exercised by the Regions. To achieve 
this objective, 
Law No. 59 of 1997 provided that each Region, in the subject matters 
falling within their legislative competence, had to transfer by regional law to 
the Provinces and the Municipalities (or to other local authorities) all the 
functions which did not require uniform exercise at regional level.38 In case a 
Region failed to transfer its administrative functions to the local authorities, 
the State had the power to substitute its action for that of the Region concerned 
and to transfer the regional functions to the local level.39
As said, the Government implemented Law No. 59 of 1997 through 
Legislative Decree No. 112 of 1998. In order to fully understand the com-
plexity of this operation, one can consider that Legislative Decree No. 112 is 
composed of over 160 articles. These articles contain lists of subject matters 
that, in certain cases, are reserved for the State, in others, are transferred to the 
Regions and the local authorities, and, in other cases again, are areas in which 
there is at the same time a competence of the State, of the Regions, and of the 
local authorities.40
The ‘transfer process’ designed by the Bassanini reform is very complex. As 
demonstrated by recent studies, such complexity has determined that the 
reform has yet to be fully implemented.41 
38  The Constitutional Court held this part of Law No. 59 of 1997 to be compliant with the 
Constitution. See A. Anzon, ‘«Leale collaborazione» tra Stato e Regioni, modalità 
partecipative e controllo di costituzionalità’, in Giurisprudenza costituzionale, 1998, 
p. 3531 ff.
39  See Art. 4(5) of Law No. 59 of 15 March 1997: “. . . If a Region fails to act by the deadline, 
the Government, after hearing the non-compliant Region, is delegated to adopt by 31 
March 1999 one or more legislative decrees allocating administrative responsibilities 
between the Region and the local authorities.” 
40  For example, Article 28(2) Lit. a of Legislative Decree No. 112 of 1998 deals with the 
subject matter ‘energy’. This is defi ned as the array of administrative functions relating to 
“research, production, transport and supply of any form of energy”. Article 29 stipulates 
that “scientifi c research in the fi eld of energy” is a responsibility of the State. Article 30(5) 
of the same Decree includes among the tasks of the Regions “the supply of information to 
the public and the training of public and private operators in the fi elds of projecting, 
installing, running, and controlling thermic plants”. Finally, Article 31(1) provides that 
the local authorities shall be responsible for the “administrative functions of control on 
energy saving and the rational use of energy”. 
41  See G. d’Alessio and F. di Lascio (eds), Il sistema amministrativo a dieci anni dalla “Riforma 
Bassanini”, Torino, 2009, pp. 117–170.
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8.3 The 2001 constitutional reform
8.3.1 Preliminary notations
The 2001 constitutional reform42 is a ‘next of kin’ of the Bassanini reform of 
1997–1998. It is accurate to say that the constitutional reform strengthened 
the powers of the local authorities and ‘upgraded’ the system created by the 
Bassanini reform to the constitutional level.43
However, the meaning of the constitutional reform, at least as far as the local 
government is concerned, is far from clear. Indeed, like in the original text of 
the 1948 Constitution, the ‘tier of government’ that received more attention is 
the Region. This is confi rmed by the high number of constitutional articles 
dealing with the Regions; this number is far superior to the number of provi-
sions regulating local authorities. In the light of this ‘disproportion’ it appears 
still true what Livio Paladin used to say about the 1948 Constitution; in rela-
tion to local authorities, the Constitution still is a ‘blank page’ which needs to 
be written (cf. above section 8.1.3.). For example, in the Constitution as 
amended in 2001, there is no specifi c provision determining the ‘fundamental 
functions’ of the local authorities. Furthermore, the election of the principle of 
subsidiarity as the basic rule for the allocation of administrative functions to 
the different tiers of government (cf. Article 118 of the Constitution) does not 
resolve the legal uncertainty. On the contrary, the uncertainty is increased, due 
to the ambiguity of the constitutional provision.
8.3.2 The myth of the ‘equality’ of the tiers of government 
which constitute the Republic (Article 114 of the Constitution)
In the Constitution as amended in 2001 there are a number of provisions which 
attracted a great deal of interest among legal scholars. The most important – 
and almost ‘revolutionary’, if compared with the previous situation – is certainly 
Article 114(1) of the Constitution.44 According to this article “The Republic is 
composed of the Municipalities, the Provinces, the Metropolitan Cities, the 
Regions and the State”; from this provision seems prima facie to arise that the 
different ‘elements’ the Republic is composed of are placed on an equal footing. 
This seems to imply the ‘revolutionary’ result that the Municipalities have the 
same ‘dignity’ as the Regions and the State. Also, the State seems to be only one 
among the different entities which form part of the Republic.45
42  Constitutional Revision Act No. 3 of 2001.
43  See A. Ruggeri, Riforme costituzionali e decentramento di poteri alle autonomie territoriali in 
Italia, dal punto di vista della teoria della Costituzione, in Federalismi.it (www.federalismi.it), 
published on 8 November 2006.
44  Before the 2001 amendment Article 114 stipulated: “The Republic is sub-divided into 
Regions, Provinces and Municipalities.”
45  S. Gambino, ‘L’ordinamento repubblicano: fra principi costituzionali e nuovo assetto 
territoriale dei poteri’, in S. Gambino (ed.), Diritto regionale e degli enti locali, 2nd edn, 
Milano, 2008, p. 5.
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In reality, things are not in these terms. Local authorities do not have the 
same legal status and the same political signifi cance as the State or the 
Regions. This is due to a number of reasons; fi rst, State and Regions, unlike 
Provinces and (maybe) Municipalities, cannot be suppressed, otherwise the 
Republic would be dissolved;46 second, State and Regions, unlike Provinces 
and Municipalities, have legislative powers;47 third, State and Regions, unlike 
Provinces and Municipalities, have the right to fi le a lawsuit before the 
Constitutional Court in order to defend their competences.48 In sum, the local 
authorities are not on an equal footing as the State and the Regions. A differ-
ent interpretation of Article 114 would be inaccurate, as it would go 
against what other constitutional provisions establish. Indeed, the Consti-
tution assigns different roles and competences, i.e. different powers, to the 
different tiers of government and this determines a profound disparity 
between them. 
8.3.3 The principle of subsidiarity (Article 118 of 
the Constitution)
Article 114 of the Constitution can be ascribed a meaning consistent with the 
rest of the Constitution, if it is taken together with Article 118 on the 
principle of subsidiarity. Pursuant to this principle the administrative 
functions have to be, if possible, allocated to the tier of government which is 
closest to the community of citizens. Of all local authorities that form part of 
the Republic, the Municipality is defi nitely the closest to that community. 
For this reason it should be considered as the most important authority and it 
should be given priority in the allocation of the administrative functions in 
the context of the Republic.
The link between Article 114 and Article 118 of the Constitution stands 
out if one looks at the fi rst paragraph of Article 118: “Administrative functions 
are attributed to the Municipalities, unless they are attributed to the Provinces, 
Metropolitan Cities and Regions or to the State, pursuant to the principles of 
subsidiarity, differentiation and proportionality, to ensure their uniform 
implementation”. The Municipality is therefore the ‘foundation’ of the legal 
order, insofar as it is the public authority which is closest to the community 
of citizens and it is the fi rst branch of action of the Republic.
In the light of the principle of subsidiarity, Article 114 of the Constitution 
does not really place all the authorities which form part of the Republic on an 
equal footing. In reality, Article 114 contains a ‘preference’ for the allocation 
of administrative functions to the Municipalities, and, only if that is not 
46  The Constitution does not provide the abolition of the State and of the Regions. Legal 
scholars agree that the regional form of the Italian State is a supreme constitutional 
principle which cannot be repealed. 
47  See Article 117 of the Constitution.
48  See Article 134 of the Constitution.
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viable, to the Provinces and the Regions, respectively. Such preference 
accorded to the Municipalities, though, raises the question of which public 
authority has the power to decide on the allocation of the administrative 
functions in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.
This is the most controversial aspect of Article 118 of the Constitution. 
Indeed, the real protagonists of the decisions on the allocation of the admin-
istrative functions are the State and the Regions. The political decision on 
‘whether’ a function requires ‘uniform implementation’, and on ‘which’ tier of 
government is better placed to exercise that function, i.e., can guarantee 
higher effectiveness and effi ciency, is left with the State, or the Regions, in 
accordance with their legislative competences under Article 117 of the 
Constitution.49
Since the 2001 constitutional reform, State and Regions passed a number 
of laws allocating administrative functions to the different tiers of government. 
The constitutional justifi cation of this power of the State and of the Regions 
is to be found in the principle of legality, as defi ned in Article 97 of the 
Constitution: “Public offi ces are organised according to the provisions of law, 
so as to ensure the effi ciency and impartiality of administration”. The principle 
of legality implies that the distribution of administrative competences within 
the Republic (which is part of the ‘organisation of public offi ces’) is reserved 
for those authorities that are endowed with legislative power (that is, the State 
and the Regions).50
All in all, the entrenchment of the principle of subsidiarity in the Italian 
legal order and in the Italian Constitution, has not determined an ‘auto-
matic’ and ‘full’ devolution of administrative responsibilities to the 
Municipalities. Indeed, the principle of subsidiarity only implies that the 
public authorities with legislative power have to decide ‘whether’ it is viable 
to allocate a certain administrative function to the Municipalities and, if this 
is not viable, ‘to which’ tier of government the function should be attributed. 
This operation is characterised by wide discretion and, according to the 
circumstances, this can lead to an increase or a decrease in the number 
and scope of the administrative responsibilities of the Municipalities and of 
the Provinces. 
8.3.4 The exclusive legislative competence of the State on local 
authorities (Article 117, paragraph 2, Lit. p, of the Constitution)
An important constitutional provision relating to local authorities is Article 
117, paragraph 2, Lit. p, which stipulates that “electoral legislation, governing 
49  On the distribution of legislative competences between State and Regions in the Italian 
Constitution, see M. Ruotolo, ‘Il riparto delle competenze legislative tra Stato e Regioni, a 
dieci anni dalla riforma costituzionale’, in Diritto e società, 2011, pp. 113 ff.
50  Cf. D. Donati, ‘Il principio di sussidiarietà nell’ordinamento regionale: enunciazioni, effetti e 
connessioni’, in Le Regioni, 2010, pp. 1399 ff.
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bodies and fundamental functions” of the local authorities are subject matters 
falling within the exclusive legislative competence of the State. 
Two of the three aforementioned topics fi nd their regulation in the TUEL; 
‘electoral legislation’ in Articles 55–70,51 and ‘governing bodies’ in Articles 
36–54. The third topic (fundamental functions) is surrounded by a considerable 
degree of uncertainty. It is diffi cult to say what parts of the TUEL actually 
deal with functions that can be deemed ‘fundamental’. In 2003 the Law ‘La 
Loggia’ (so named after the Minister for Regional Affairs of the Centre-Right 
Government, Enrico La Loggia)52 made an attempt to sketch out the ‘funda-
mental functions’ of the local authorities. It delegated the Government to 
adopt a legislative decree listing the “fundamental functions . . . essential for 
the functioning of the Municipalities, the Provinces and the Metropolitan 
Cities”.53 However, despite a few extensions of the implementation deadline,54 
the legislative delegation expired at last on 31 December 2005. Given that 
“the good intentions of the Government remained on paper”,55 the relationship 
between the 2001 constitutional reform and the TUEL (2000) is the following; 
the TUEL, even if passed one year before the constitutional reform, in actual 
fact specifi es the content of the Constitution. In relation specifi cally to the 
‘fundamental functions’ of local authorities, in the Italian legal order it still 
lacks a piece of legislation that identifi es them in clear terms.56 
8.3.5 Financial autonomy and taxation power of the local 
authorities (Article 119 of the Constitution)
For a long time, the issue of the fi nancial autonomy of the local authorities is 
the subject of a vivid debate which recently culminated in the passage of Law 
51  In relation to the following three aspects; limits to the right to be a candidate in local 
elections (‘incandidabilità’), restrictions to the right of an elected candidate to take offi ce 
after the election (‘ineleggibilità), and incompatibility between the offi ce of counsellor or 
administrator in a local authority and other activities (‘incompatibilità’).
52  Law No. 131 of 5 June 2003 entitled “Legal provisions for adapting the legal order of the 
Republic to the Constitutional Revision Act No. 3 of 18 October 2001”.
53  See Article 2(1) of Law No. 131 of 5 June 2003. 
54  See Article 1 of Law No. 140 of 28 May 2004 and Article 5 of Law No. 306 of 27 December 
2004.
55  The quote is from A. Ruggeri, Riforme costituzionali e decentramento di poteri alle autonomie 
territoriali in Italia, dal punto di vista della teoria della Costituzione, cited in f’note 43, at 
paragraph 4.
56  Art. 19 of the Decree Law No. 95 of 6 July 2012 (transposed into Law No. 135 of 7 August 
2012), provided the fi rst list of ‘fundamental functions’ of the Municipalities. This list 
includes (among others): organisation of public services of general interest in the territory 
of the Municipality; planning of the urban development and of the building regulation in 
the municipal territory; organisation and management of the services of waste collection, 
disposal and management; planning and management of social welfare at municipal level. 
This enumeration refers to broadly defi ned subject matters. The scope of the subject 
matters will need to be further specifi ed by new legislative acts and, given that legal 
disputes are likely to arise, by court cases. 
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No. 42 of 5 May 2009. This important piece of legislation, which still needs 
to be fully implemented, will be analysed in further detail infra at section 
8.5.4. This section will be devoted to the constitutional framework of the 
fi nancial autonomy of the local authorities. 
The new text of Article 119 of the Constitution, at paragraph 1, lays down 
the principle according to which the local authorities shall have fi nancial 
autonomy.57 In general terms this form of autonomy is composed of two 
elements; the fi rst is the assertion that the local authorities shall have a certain 
amount of money at their disposal (‘revenues’, ‘entrate’); the second is the 
right of the local authorities to use these fi nancial resources to fund their 
functions (‘expenditures’, ‘spese’).
The fi rst element of the notion of ‘fi nancial autonomy’ (that is, the reve-
nues) is further specifi ed in paragraph 2 of Article 119 of the Constitution. 
According to this provision, the local authorities “shall have independent 
fi nancial resources”, “set and levy taxes and collect revenues of their own”, and 
“share in the tax revenues related to their respective territories”. The second 
element of the notion of ‘fi nancial autonomy’ (that is, the expenditures) fi nds 
further specifi cation in paragraph 5 of Article 119 of the Constitution. 
According to this provision, the revenues raised from all the aforementioned 
sources shall enable the local authorities “to fully fi nance the public functions 
attributed to them”. 
According to some legal scholars,58 the new text of Article 119 of the 
Constitution introduced in Italy the principle of ‘fi scal federalism’. This is 
expected to lead to a wider fi nancial autonomy of local authorities. Indeed, the 
logic of fi scal federalism is that the power to levy taxes should (of preference) 
belong to the tier of government which is closest to the citizens (the taxpayers). 
That tier of government should also have the right to decide how to use the 
collected revenue. The local community would be well placed to control that 
the local authority uses its tax revenue in an appropriate way. From this point 
of view, it is apparent the link between the concept of ‘fi scal federalism’ and 
the principle of subsidiarity, the link being the fundamental principle ‘no 
taxation without representation’.59
The illustrated interpretation in favour of the local authorities can be 
contrasted to a different interpretation not as supportive of the autonomy of 
local authorities.60 According to this train of thought, Article 119 limited the 
fi nancial autonomy of local authorities. Indeed, the entire Italian system of 
57  On this topic see P. Bonetti, ‘L’autonomia fi nanziaria regionale e locale come motore delle 
autonomie territoriali: un’introduzione dall’art. 114 all’art. 119 Cost’, in Le Regioni, 2010, 
pp. 1161 ff.
58  See S. Musolino, ‘Potestà legislativa statale di coordinamento della fi nanza pubblica e 
puntuali vincoli alla spesa delle regioni: la corte costituzionale boccia il legislatore statale’, 
in Corriere Giuridico, 2006, 2, pp. 192 ff.
59  On this topic see P. Liberati, Il federalismo fi scale. Aspetti teorici e pratici, Milano, 2003.
60  See A. Villa, ‘La legge delega sul federalismo fi scale’, in Giornale di Diritto Amministrativo, 2009, 
8, pp. 837 ff.
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taxation should be construed in the light of Article 23 of the Constitution 
under which obligations of fi nancial nature can only be imposed by law. It 
follows the impossibility to recognise a wide autonomy to local authorities in 
the fi eld of taxation, for the simple reason that these authorities do not have 
legislative powers. Furthermore, the fi nancial autonomy of local authorities is 
limited by budgetary policies imposed by the European Union,61 as well as by 
State measures aimed to ensure the sustainability of the welfare state in the 
whole national territory,62 and by the “equalisation of fi nancial resources”.63 
Since local authorities need a legislative authorisation enabling them to levy 
taxes, it follows that it is the very concept of ‘fi scal federalism’ to be deprived 
of any real meaning. The funding of local authorities will originate from 
‘revenues’ and ‘taxes’ regulated by State or regional law.64 
It is submitted that the more credible of the two illustrated interpre-
tations of Article 119 is the second. In actual fact, even after the 2001 
constitutional reform, the funding of local authorities is still largely reliant 
upon the State.
8.4 Local authorities in the regions 
with special autonomy
For the sake of completeness, it needs to be addressed the position of the local 
authorities in the fi ve Regions with special autonomy. In actual fact, the above 
illustrated constitutional provisions on local government do not fi nd applica-
tion in these Regions. It is therefore required an explanation of the legal status 
of the Regions with special autonomy. 
The 1948 Constitution built a State with Regions and local authorities. All 
the Regions are endowed with political, legislative, administrative and 
fi nancial autonomy. The constitutional norms apply to fi fteen Regions;65 the 
Regions with ‘ordinary’ autonomy. Other fi ve Regions (Sicily, Sardinia, Friuli-
Venezia Giulia, Trentino-Alto Adige, and Valle d’Aosta) are granted ‘special’ 
autonomy, that is, powers (in the legislative, administrative, and fi nancial 
61  That is, by the Stability Pact, which implies the obligation for the Italian State to keep 
its budget defi cit within a certain limit. See G. Fransoni and G. della Cananea, ‘Commento 
all’art. 119’, in R. Bifulco et al. (eds), Commentario alla Costituzione, Torino, 2006, 
pp. 2358 ff.
62  Vedi G. della Cananea, L’insostenibile onerosità dell’attuale “federalismo fi scale”, gli accorgimenti 
per porvi rimedio, keynote talk at the Seminario Svimez held on 4 December 2008, in 
Quaderno Svimez, No. 20, April 2009, pp. 9 ff.
63  See Art. 117(2) Lit. e and Art. 119(3) of the Constitution.
64  On this point see infra section 8.5.4., where Law No. 42 of 2009 will be discussed. A 
critical stance of the existing Italian setting is that of S. Pellegrini, ‘L’autonomia tributaria 
delle Regioni è condizionata dalle leggi statali di coordinamento’, in Diritto e Pratica 
Tributaria, 2005, 06, pp. 1291 ff. 
65  The 15 Regions in question are: Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Emilia-Romagna, 
Lazio, Liguria, Lombardia (Lombardy), Marche, Molise, Piemonte (Piedmont), Puglia, 
Toscana (Tuscany), Umbria, and Veneto.
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fi elds) wider than those of the other (‘ordinary’) Regions. Whilst the ‘ordinary’ 
Regions fi nd their regulation in the Constitution, the ‘special’ Regions are 
specifi cally regulated by their own Statutes. Each regional Statute contains 
the basic norms for the Region concerned. In the case of the Regions with 
special autonomy the Statutes have the form of constitutional laws of the State 
(that is, of laws adopted with the same procedure required for amendments to 
the Constitution66). 
In the Regions with special autonomy, the Statutes attribute the regulation 
of the subject matter ‘law on the local authorities’ to the regional law. 
However, this does not imply that the ‘special’ Regions have an unlimited 
power to regulate the structure and modus operandi of the local authorities 
within their own territorial jurisdiction. The Constitutional Court held that 
the ‘special’ Regions need to legislate in ‘harmony’ with the Constitution and 
must also respect the ‘general principles of the legal order’.67 Such restrictions 
rule out that the ‘special’ Regions can adopt regulations that are blatantly 
non-compliant with the Constitution.
Each of the fi ve Regions with special autonomy adopted a specifi c regulation 
of the local government within the regional territory. In a seminal study 
legal scholar Luciano Vandelli examined the different regulations.68 The 
author found that among the topics falling within the scope of the regional 
competence there are the following: 
• instituting and suppressing the Provinces within the regional territory; 
• regulating the election of the political bodies of the Municipalities and of 
the Provinces;
• allocating responsibilities to the different tiers of government within the 
Region; 
• regulating forms of control on the local authorities; 
• regulating the relations between the Region and the local authorities. 
66  Cf. Art. 138 of the Constitution: “(1) Laws amending the Constitution and other constitu-
tional laws shall be adopted by each House after two successive debates at intervals of not 
less than three months, and shall be approved by an absolute majority of the members of 
each House in the second voting. (2) Said laws are submitted to a popular referendum 
when, within three months of their publication, such request is made by one-fi fth of the 
members of a House or fi ve hundred thousand voters or fi ve Regional Councils. The law 
submitted to referendum shall not be promulgated if not approved by a majority of valid 
votes. (3) A referendum shall not be held if the law has been approved in the second voting 
by each of the Houses by a majority of two-thirds of the members.” The Special Statute of 
Sardinia was approved by Constitutional Law No. 3 of 26 February 1948; the Special 
Statute of Valle d’Aosta was approved by Constitutional Law No. 4 of 26 February 1948; 
the Special Statute of Friuli-Venezia Giulia was approved by Constitutional Law No. 1 of 
31 January 1963; the Special Statute of Trentino-Alto Adige was approved by Decree of 
President of Republic No. 670 of 31 August 1972. The oldest Special Statute is that of 
Sicily which was approved by Royal Decree No. 455 of 15 May 1946.
67  See the Ruling of the Constitutional Court No. 230 of 2001.
68  See L. Vandelli, Il Sistema delle autonomie, cited f’note 1, pp. 230–238.
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This list shows the wide-ranging scope of the competences of the Regions 
with special autonomy. However, as previously stated, such a wide-ranging 
power of regulation meets some limits. For example, the Regions cannot 
abolish the participation rights of the local authorities in the regional legisla-
tive process when matters are discussed that belong to the competence of the 
local authorities.69 Also, the local electoral system has to respect the require-
ments set by State legislation in relation to the right to be a candidate in local 
elections, as an inviolable restriction to the autonomy of the Regions with a 
Special Statute.70 
8.5 The unifi ed text on local authorities (TUEL)
8.5.1 The relationship between the 2000 TUEL and 
the 2001 constitutional reform 
As mentioned above, the Unifi ed Text on Local Authorities (TUEL) was 
passed in 2000.71 Before dealing with it in further detail, it is necessary to 
explore an important profi le; the compatibility between the TUEL and the 
constitutional reform. It is reasonable to assume that, being the TUEL 
the most important piece of legislation on local government, if it happened 
to be incompatible with the Constitution, it would have been ‘wiped out’ by 
the constitutional reform. The fact that the TUEL could ‘survive’ the con-
stitutional reform demonstrates the little innovation of the reform in relation 
to local authorities. In order to provide an outline of the main features of local 
authorities (especially Municipalities and Provinces), it is therefore required 
to shed a close look at the detailed provisions of the TUEL.
8.5.2 The autonomy of local authorities
The fi rst aspect that needs to be analysed is the autonomy of the local 
authorities. Article 3 of the TUEL, entitled ‘Autonomy of the Municipalities 
and the Provinces’, stipulates, at paragraph 1, that “The local communities, 
organised in the form of Municipalities and Provinces, are autonomous”. The 
second paragraph adds that the Municipality is the local authority which 
“represents, looks after the interests and promotes the development of the 
own community”. Finally, the third paragraph establishes (with a formula 
that resembles that of paragraph (2) that the Province is the ‘intermediate’ 
local authority between the Municipality and the Region, insofar as it 
“represents, looks after the interests, promotes and coordinates the development 
of the own community”. 
69  See the Ruling of the Constitutional Court No. 238 of 2007.
70  See the Ruling of the Constitutional Court No. 105 of 1957.
71  On the TUEL see R. Cavallo Perin and A. Romano (eds), Commentario breve al testo unico sulle 
autonomie locali, Padova, 2006.
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Both Municipalities and Provinces ‘represent’ the respective communities 
and look after their interests; these authorities can be seen as ‘representative 
entities’ (‘enti esponenziali’) of the respective populations. This important 
mission that the TUEL assigns to Municipalities and Provinces justifi es the 
autonomy granted to these authorities, in the sense that the autonomy is 
designed to accomplish their institutional mission.
In practice this implies that the local authorities have the power to create a 
‘public service’,72 that is, to decide what type of activity to perform in order to 
achieve the ‘social aims’ and to promote the ‘economic and civic development’ 
of the local community.73 
A further consequence of the local autonomy is that both the Municipalities 
and the Provinces have the right to challenge before a court the validity of 
those administrative measures that negatively affect them.74 
The autonomy is an instrument that aims to achieve those policy objectives 
which are independently chosen by Municipalities and Provinces. Paragraph 
4 of Article 3 of the TUEL states that Municipalities and Provinces have an 
autonomy which is “statutory, regulatory, organisational, administrative, of 
taxation and fi nancial” (“statutaria, normativa, organizzativa, amministrativa, 
impositiva e fi nanziaria”). This autonomy needs to be exercised in a way which 
is compliant with (municipal or provincial) Statutes, (regional and State) 
regulations and (regional and State) laws.
Three main elements emerge from Article 3 of the TUEL. The fi rst is that 
Municipalities and Provinces are autonomous authorities. The second is that 
Municipalities and Provinces are endowed with different types of autonomy. 
The third is that such autonomy is aimed and required to look after the 
interests of the local communities. However, there is no legal provision clearly 
defi ning the concept of ‘autonomy’.
According to infl uential legal scholar Mario Nigro the notion of autonomy 
is “pretty obscure”.75 To provide a reliable defi nition of ‘autonomy’, it is 
therefore useful to start from the etymology of the word. ‘Autonomy’ is a 
Greek word whose literal meaning is ‘one giving themselves their own law’. 
In the context of local government, this concept can be translated into ‘self-
government’ (‘autogoverno’), that is, as the “guarantee of a space protected 
from interference of a higher authority”.76
72  Cf. Article 112 ff. of the TUEL. 
73  Cf. Regional Administrative Court of Liguria, Second Division, Ruling No. 527 of 28 
April 2005, in Foro amministrativo, TAR 2005, 4, pp. 1022 ff.
74  Cf. Regional Administrative Court of Marche, Ruling No. 1015 of 19 September 2003, in 
Foro amministrativo, TAR 2003, pp. 2604 ff. See also Council of State (supreme judicial 
authority on administrative matters), Fourth Division, Ruling No. 1559 of 24 March 
2004, in Foro amministrativo, CDS 2004, p. 806.
75  See M. Nigro, Il Governo locale, Roma, 1980, p. 59.
76  See S. Romano, ‘Autonomia’ (1945), in Frammenti di un dizionario giuridico, Milano, 1983 
(reprint), pp. 14 ff. See also A. Romano, ‘Autonomia nel diritto pubblico’, in Digesto di 
diritto pubblico, Vol. II, 1987, pp. 30 ff.
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The concept of autonomy has been widely studied by Italian legal scholars. 
According to leading legal scholar Massimo Severo Giannini, ‘autonomy’ can 
only be understood if one identifi es its object.77 This authoritative guideline 
will be followed in the next sections of this chapter. More specifi cally, the next 
section will examine ‘regulatory autonomy’ and the ‘statutory autonomy’ 
(section 8.5.3.), whilst the following section will deal with ‘autonomy in 
imposing taxes’ and ‘fi nancial autonomy’ (section 8.5.4.). As to ‘organisational’ 
and ‘administrative autonomy’, since they are not specifi cally regulated in the 
TUEL, it is suffi cient to say that the fi rst (‘organisational autonomy’) is 
the right of local authorities to choose their organisational structure, 
whilst the second (‘administrative autonomy’) is the right of local authorities 
to adopt administrative measures aimed to produce an external effect in 
relation to the local community. 
8.5.3 Regulatory and statutory autonomy
In broad terms the concept of ‘regulatory’ autonomy includes both the ‘statu-
tory’ and the ‘regulatory’ (strictly speaking) autonomy.78 The term ‘statutory’ 
refers to the Statute of the Municipalities and of the Provinces. This is the 
basic law (a sort of ‘constitution’) of these authorities. Article 6 of the TUEL 
establishes that each local authority has to have a Statute. Such obligation 
originates from the fi rst paragraph of the said Article, according to which 
Municipalities and Provinces “adopt” (“adottano”) their own Statutes.79
The Statute (municipal or provincial) has to regulate certain topics. The 
most important ones are “fundamental norms for the organisation of the 
authority”, “external representation of the authority”, “forms of collaboration 
between Municipalities and Provinces”, and “norms on equal opportunities of 
men and women”.
The Statute (both municipal and provincial) fi nds an important limit in the 
State law; in particular, the TUEL contains considerable restrictions to the 
‘statutory’ autonomy of local authorities. For example, if one looks at the topic 
‘fundamental norms for the organisation of the authority’, it emerges that the 
scope of the provision does not include all municipal or provincial bodies 
and offi ces, but only those bodies and offi ces which are not regulated by the 
TUEL. For example, the (municipal or provincial) Council, the (municipal or 
77  See M. S. Giannini, ‘Autonomia’, in Enciclopedia del diritto, Vol. IV, Milano, 1958, pp. 356 ff.
78  The Constitution grants to local authorities both the ‘statutory’ autonomy, that is, the 
power to give themselves a Statute (‘potestà statutaria’), and the ‘regulatory’ autonomy, 
that is, the power to adopt regulations. The relevant provisions are Article 114(2) of the 
Constitution (“Municipalities, Provinces, Metropolitan Cities and Regions are autonomous 
entities having their own Statutes”) and Article 117(6) of the Constitution (“Municipalities, 
Provinces and Metropolitan Cities have regulatory powers as to the organisation and 
implementation of the functions attributed to them”).
79  The use of the verb ‘to adopt’ (‘adottare’) in the present tense and indicative form denotes 
a legal obligation.
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provincial) Executive, and the Mayor (the head of Municipality) or the 
President of the Province (the head of Province), fi nd a comprehensive regula-
tion in the TUEL,80 and, as a consequence, cannot be regulated in a different 
way by the Statute.81 Other bodies and offi ces, whose regulation is not laid 
down by the TUEL, may be regulated in the Statute of the local authority.82 
Despite the illustrated limits, the Statute of a local authority can be 
considered as a ‘primary’ source of law; in other terms, in those spaces the 
State law reserved for it, the Statute has a force equivalent to that of a State 
(or a regional) law.83 A State law could certainly further restrict the space for 
municipal and provincial Statutes; however, no law could entirely cancel that 
space. This is due to the fact that the ‘statutory’ autonomy is entrenched in 
Article 114(2) of the Constitution (“Municipalities, Provinces, Metropolitan 
Cities and Regions are autonomous entities having their own Statutes”).
The legal ‘force’ of the Statute does not only stem from the Constitution; it 
also derives from the procedure for its approval. The passage of the Statute 
requires a two-thirds majority within the (municipal or provincial) Council. 
In case such a majority is not achieved, the Statute will need to be approved 
twice by absolute majority.84 
The power to adopt a Statute is the principal expression of the regulatory 
autonomy (broadly understood) of local authorities. The ‘regulatory’ autonomy 
(strictly understood), that is, the power to adopt local (municipal or provincial) 
regulations has a lower standing in comparison with the ‘statutory’ autonomy. 
Local regulations cannot contain provisions which are non-compliant with 
the Statute, otherwise the regulation can be ‘set aside’ or ‘annulled’ by a court, 
or by any administrative authority.85 
Also the power to adopt regulations is entrenched in the Constitution. 
Article 117(6) of the Constitution states that “Municipalities, Provinces and 
Metropolitan Cities have regulatory powers as to the organisation and 
implementation of the functions attributed to them”.86 The basic provision on 
local regulations is Article 7 of the TUEL. From that provision it emerges the 
80  Cf. Article 36 ff. of the TUEL.
81  Cf. Regional Administrative Court of Campania, Salerno, First Division, Ruling No. 943 
of 4 July 2006, in the case Onlus Aido v. Comune di Battipaglia, in Foro amministrativo, TAR 
2006, 7–8, p. 2619.
82  This is for example the case of the Civic Defender (‘difensore civico’, more immediately 
understandable as ‘defender of the citizens’). According to Article 11 of the TUEL the Civic 
Defender can be instituted by the Statute of the local authority.
83  See Court of Cassation, United Civil Law Divisions, Ruling No. 12868 of 16 June 2005, 
in Rivista giuridica tributaria, 2005, p. 1015.
84  See Article 6(4) of the TUEL.
85  See Council of State, Fifth Division, Ruling No. 148 of 25 January 2005, in Rivista della 
Corte dei conti, 2005, 1, p. 302.
86  On the topic of State, regional, and local regulations see C. Tubertini, ‘Riforma costituzionale 
e potestà regolamentare dello Stato’, in Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico, 2002, pp. 935 
ff. See also M. C. Romano, ‘Spazi e confi ni dell’autonomia regolamentare: i regolamenti dei 
comuni nell’art. 117, VI comma, Cost.’, in Diritto amministrativo, 2007, pp. 851 ff.
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lower standing of local regulations in the hierarchy of norms, if compared 
with the position of the local Statute. Indeed, Article 7 stipulates that 
Municipalities and Provinces adopt their regulations “respecting the principles 
established by [State and regional] law and by the Statute”.87
Article 7 of the TUEL does not only create a ‘hierarchy’ between Statute 
and local regulations. It also specifi es the topics that fall within the scope of 
the regulatory power of local authorities. These topics are “organisation” and 
“functioning” of local institutions, as well as of forms of participatory 
democracy, and, fi nally, of bodies and offi ces of the local authority. 
The aforementioned topics are also concerned by State (or regional) 
laws; one of those is the (State) Law No. 241 of 1990 on the decision-
making process of administrative authorities.88 The general principles of the 
decision-making process of administrative authorities are established by 
State law, whilst local regulations can only, within this ‘framework’, further 
specify the principles entailed by State law.89 For example, a local regulation 
waiving the requirement (established by State law) that there must be a public 
offi cial responsible for each decision-making process, would be invalid. 
Actually, Article 4 of Law No. 241 of 1990 establishes that requirement in 
relation to ‘all’ administrative decision-making processes.
Administrative courts dealt with the important question of whether local 
authorities are entitled to enact regulations also on topics other than those 
listed in Article 7 of the TUEL. The courts found that local authorities 
are indeed allowed to do so; being the local authorities ‘entities with 
general aims’ (‘enti a fi ni generali’, that is, entities which look after the overall 
interests and welfare of the local community), they are vested with the power 
to issue regulations also in fi elds not expressly attributed to them by State or 
regional law.90 Such a wide-ranging regulatory power of local authorities is 
perfectly consistent with the ‘mission’ assigned to local authorities in the 
Italian legal order. 
87  Cf. Article 7(1) of the TUEL. See Council of State, Fifth Division, Ruling No. 147 of 
25 January 2005, in Foro amministrativo, CDS, 2005, 1, p. 118.
88  Law No. 241 of 7 August 1990 entitled ‘New rules on the decision-making process 
of administrative authorities and on the right of access to administrative documents’. 
On this piece of legislation see G. Fares, ‘Il procedimento amministrativo’, in G. Corso 
and V. Lopilato (eds), Il diritto amministrativo dopo le riforme costituzionali, Vol. I, 
Milano, 2006, pp. 563 ff., and, more recently, see also G. Falcon, ‘La legge sul procedi-
mento amministrativo e i caratteri del “federalismo” italiano’, in Le Regioni, 2010, 
pp. 1227 ff.
89  See S. Civitarese Matteucci, ‘L’autonomia istituzionale e normativa degli Enti locali dopo la 
revisione del Titolo V’, in Le Regioni, 2002, p. 472. 
90  Cf. Council of State, Fifth Division, Ruling No. 6317 of 27 September 2004, in Foro 
amministrativo, CDS, 2004, pp. 2611 ff., and, more recently, cf. Regional Administrative 
Court of Sicily, Catania, Third Division, Ruling No. 258 of 4 February 2011, in Foro 
amministrativo, TAR, 2011, 2, p. 657. On this topic see M. Sias, I regolamenti indipendenti e 
il nuovo Titolo V, in Federalismi.it (www.federalismi.it), 7 August 2003.
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8.5.4 Autonomy in imposing taxes and the fi nancial autonomy
The forms of autonomy recognised for local authorities are not rigidly separated 
from one another. As shown in the previous analysis, the concept of ‘regulatory’ 
autonomy covers both the right to adopt a Statute and the right to issue 
regulations. Similarly, ‘autonomy in imposing taxes’ and ‘fi nancial autonomy’ 
are closely linked. To be precise, ‘fi nancial autonomy’ is the overarching 
category, whilst the ‘autonomy in imposing taxes’ is a component of it.
The fi nancial autonomy (broadly understood) of Municipalities and Pro-
vinces is both the power of local authorities to impose taxes, as well as the 
right to decide how to spend the collected fi nancial resources. However, as 
seen supra at section 8.3.5, the power to impose taxes does not imply that the 
local authorities are free to ‘create’ taxes and to decide their constitutive 
elements (who is going to be liable to taxation, object of taxation, tax rate). 
The regulation of all these aspects is reserved for the State. The power of 
local authorities in relation to taxation is therefore signifi cantly limited by 
State law. 
The fi nancial autonomy and the powers of the local authorities in relation 
to taxation are mainly ‘derived’ from the State. In other words, a large part of 
the fi nancial resources of the local authorities consists of sums of money 
transferred from the State budget to the local budgets.91 
It is a State duty to dictate a uniform regulation of all taxes. Local authori-
ties only have limited opportunities to modify the decisions of the State. For 
example, within certain limits they can modify the tax rate of those taxes 
whose revenue fl ows into their budget. They can also grant tax benefi ts to 
local taxpayers, determine the price of local services, and, fi nally, put in place 
an effective tax collection system of local taxes (through, for example, direct 
collection by local offi ces, or ‘outsourcing’ of this service to private 
companies92). 
Article 149 of the TUEL specifi es the meaning of ‘fi nancial autonomy’. 
This concept relies upon an assumption; the legal certainty of the fi nancial 
resources of local authorities.93 Such certainty puts the local authorities in a 
position to plan their policies without having to negotiate with the State on a 
case-by-case basis. According to Article 149(3) of the TUEL the local 
authorities shall have the right to impose ‘duties’ (‘imposte’), ‘taxes’ (‘tasse’), 
and ‘tariffs’ (‘tariffe’), but only in relation to those aspect whose regulation is 
not reserved for State law.
It is useful to briefl y explain the meaning of the three aforementioned 
items. ‘Duties’ are due from local taxpayers and fund a service or an 
91  For further details cf. Senato della Repubblica, Dossier entitled L’attuazione dell’articolo 119 
della Costituzione: il federalismo fi scale, No. 3, November 2008, in http://www.senato.it/
documenti/repository/dossier/bilancio/Documentazione_di_fi nanza_pubblica/DFP3agg.
pdf. 
92  Cf. Council of State, Fifth Division, Order No. 3991 of 28 July 2000.
93  See Article 149(2) of the TUEL.
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infrastructure for the local community (for example, public works in the local 
area). ‘Taxes’ are due from local taxpayers and fund a service requested by the 
individual taxpayer (for example, the tax on waste collection and disposal). 
‘Tariffs’ are prices paid by local citizens for a good or an essential service 
provided by a public or private company (for example, the price of the ticket 
in the local transport).
In addition to ‘duties’, ‘taxes’, and ‘tariffs’, local fi nances are fed by “addenda 
to duties and shares of the revenue of duties”, “transfers of money from the 
State”, “transfers of money from the Regions”, “resources for investments”, 
and “other sources of income”.94 These revenues provide the most part of 
municipal and provincial income and are mainly formed by pots of money the 
local authorities receive from the State and the Regions. 
Local fi nance is the subject of an ongoing political debate known as 
‘fi scal federalism’. The guidelines of that phenomenon can be found in Law 
No. 42 of 5 May 2009 entitled ‘Delegation of legislative power to the 
Government for the introduction of fi scal federalism in application of Article 
119 of the Constitution’.95 This Law, that still needs to be fully implemented, 
aims to abolish all the transfers from the State, except for exceptional circum-
stances.96 Some scholars voiced the concern that the fl ag of fi scal federalism 
might become the ‘Trojan horse’ for cutting the public spending for local 
government.97 
8.5.5 The political organs of the local authorities
Every local authority has three political organs. They remain in offi ce for fi ve 
years. In accordance with a model that can be traced back to the Rattazzi Law 
of 1859 (cf. supra 8.1.2), the political organs of the Municipalities are: the 
Municipal Council, the Municipal Executive, and the Mayor (Art. 36, 
paragraph 1, TUEL). In a similar way, within the Provinces, they are: the 
Provincial Council, the Provincial Executive, and the President of the Province 
(Art. 36, paragraph 2, TUEL).
However, it needs to be taken into account that the incumbent Italian 
Government, led by former EU commissioner Mario Monti, introduced 
important modifi cations in relation to the Provinces, especially in relation to 
their political organs and to the competences of the Provinces.98 Such 
modifi cations will be analysed in the fi nal part of this chapter (cf. infra at 
section 8.12). In the following paragraphs of this chapter, the internal 
94  Cf. Article 149(4) of the TUEL.
95  R. Nania, La questione del “federalismo fi scale” tra principi costituzionali ed avvio del percorso 
attuativo, in Federalismi.it (www.federalismi.it), published on 2 December 2009.
96  Like those referred to in Article 119(5) of the Constitution.
97  A. Villa, La legge delega sul federalismo fi scale, cited in f’note 60. 
98  The modifi cations have been introduced through the ‘Rescue Italy’ Decree (decreto ‘Salva 
Italia, Law Decree No. 201 of 6 December 2011, transposed into Law No. 214 of 22 
December 2011).
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organisation of the Provinces will be described as it was before the recent 
modifi cations. This will facilitate the full comprehension of the innovations 
introduced by the current Government.
In both the Municipalities and in the Provinces, there are two elected 
political organs. In the Municipalities these are the Municipal Council and 
the Mayor. In the Provinces these are the Provincial Council and the President 
of the Province.
8.5.6 The electoral system in municipal and provincial elections
The election of the political organs of the local authorities is regulated by the 
TUEL (cf. Article 38, paragraph 1, and Articles 71–75, TUEL). 
The TUEL differentiates the election of the Mayor (Sindaco) in relation to 
the number of inhabitants of the Municipality. In Municipalities with less 
than 15,000 inhabitants the Mayor is elected in a single round (‘fi rst-past-the-
post’); that is, the candidate who obtains the higher number of polls wins 
the offi ce. A list of candidates to the Municipal Council (that is a party or, 
more commonly, a coalition of parties) is attached to each candidate to Mayor. 
The list attached to the successful candidate obtains two-third of the seats in 
the Municipal Council. The remaining one-third is allocated to the other lists 
of candidates in proportion to the number of votes.
In Municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants the Mayor is elected 
through a two-round system. If no candidate obtains the absolute majority of 
the votes in the fi rst round, a second round of voting occurs between the two 
candidates who obtained the higher number of votes. One or more lists of 
candidates to the Municipal Council (that is, political parties or, less often, 
coalitions of parties) are attached to each candidate to Mayor.99 
As mentioned above, in the Provinces there are two elected political 
organs: the President of the Province and the Provincial Council. In the 
Provinces the election of political organs happens in a way which is similar 
to the Municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants. The election 
of political organs of the Provinces is regulated in Articles 74 and 75 of 
the TUEL. 
8.5.7 The ‘form of government’ in Municipalities and Provinces
The concept of a ‘form of government’ describes the relationship between the 
different political organs of a local authority. In Italian local authorities, 
the form of government has its cornerstone in the Mayor and in the President 
of the Province. This is due to the fact that “the Mayor and the President of 
 99  The method for the distribution of seats within the Municipal Council is quite complicated 
as the method varies if the Mayor is elected in the fi rst round or in the second round. 
However, it is superfl uous to add further details about this aspect whose regulation can be 
found at Articles 72 and 73 of the TUEL.
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the Province shall be elected by citizens by universal and direct suffrage” 
(Article 46, paragraph 1, TUEL).
The direct election of the ‘head’ of the local authority (Mayor for the 
Municipality, President of the Province for the Province) justifi es the important 
powers that are attached to these roles and especially explains why the local 
form of government is described as characterised by a ‘presidentialist’ tendency.100
The Mayor and the President of the Province chair the Municipal and 
the Provincial Executive (Art. 50, paragraph 2, TUEL), appoint and 
revoke the members of the Executive (Art. 46, paragraphs 2 and 4, TUEL),101 
appoint the directors of the local offi ces and services (Art. 50, paragraph 10, 
TUEL). 
However, the local form of government is only ‘basically’, but not entirely, 
presidential. The Municipal Council and the Provincial Council can actually 
pass a no confi dence vote in order to oblige the Mayor or the President of the 
Province to resign. At the same time, if, as a consequence of, or independent 
of a no confi dence vote, the Mayor or the President of the Province decide to 
(or have to) resign, the Municipal or the Provincial Council respectively are 
dissolved before the end of term. The essence of the relationship between the 
Municipal (or Provincial) Council and the Mayor (or President of the Province) 
is effectively summarised by the Latin expression ‘simul stabunt simul cadent’ 
(‘together they stand, together they fall’). 
Despite the ‘simul stabunt simul cadent’ rule, in practice the head of the 
local authority (Mayor or President of the Province) is the cornerstone of the 
local authority. The (Municipal or Provincial) Executive is no more than a 
body of ‘collaborators’ of the Mayor or of the President of the Province 
(cf. Art. 48, paragraph 1, TUEL). The only important act which falls within 
the exclusive competence of the Executive is the approval of the Regulation 
on the Organisation of the Offi ces and Services, which is an act regulating the 
tasks of the directors of the different offi ces and departments of the local 
authority (Art. 48, paragraph 3, TUEL).
In addition to the power to vote on a no confi dence motion, the (Municipal 
or Provincial) Council has the right to adopt the (Municipal or Provincial) 
Statute and all the Regulations of the local authority, with the sole exception 
of the Regulation on the Organisation of the Offi ces and Services. Consistent 
with the ‘presidentialist’ nature of the local form of government, the 
(Municipal or Provincial) Council does not have the power to intervene in all 
100  Cf. M. Volpi, ‘Enti territoriali, forma di governo e sistemi elettorali: estensione e limiti 
dell’autonomia’, in Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo, 2007, No. 3, pp. 1182 ff., at 
pp. 1194–1195.
101  According to the Administrative Court of Lombardy, Milan, First Division, Ruling No. 
7480 of 9 December 2010, in Foro amministrativo, TAR 2010, 12, pp. 3768 ff., the 
appointments which fall within the responsibility of the Mayor and the President of the 
Province refl ect a judgment of the head of the local authority, based on individual trust. 
The consequence is that when the head of a local authority leaves the offi ce, also the 
appointed person has to leave their offi ce.
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subject matters. In other terms, it lacks ‘general competence’. The competence 
of the Council is limited to those ‘subject matters’ expressly provided for at 
Article 42 of the TUEL.102 
In practice the power of the (Municipal or Provincial) Council is limited by 
the circumstance that the Mayor (or the President of the Province), thanks to 
the electoral system, is usually supported by a large majority within the 
Council. This guarantees a solid support for the proposals and the initiatives 
of the ‘head’ of the local authority. 
8.5.8 The Mayor as Government Offi cial
The organisation of the Municipalities and of the Provinces is very similar. 
However, an element is different; the position of the Mayor (the head of the 
Municipality) as Government Offi cial, that is, as offi cial of the State.
The status of the Mayor can be traced back to the ‘centralistic’ Napoleonic 
tradition of local government in Italy. According to this tradition, the Mayor 
holds a ‘double hat’; the fi rst as head of the Municipality, and the second as 
Government Offi cial. In his capacity as Government Offi cial, the Mayor has a 
number of competences which are exclusively attached to this ‘hat’, and which 
do not belong to his other ‘hat’, that is, to the role as representative of the 
local community. 
Among his responsibilities as Government Offi cial there are; ‘civil status’, 
‘register offi ce’, ‘public security’ (Art. 54, paragraph 1, TUEL). Pursuant 
to these responsibilities, the Mayor will be entitled to offi ciate at civil 
weddings and to manage the recruitment in the military. Finally, in his 
capacity as Government Offi cial, the Mayor can adopt urgent measures (in the 
form of ordinances) aimed to tackle exceptional situations affecting the public 
safety. This power has been further expanded, insofar as the Mayor has been 
given the authority to adopt ordinances even outside the requirements of 
‘urgency’ and ‘exceptionality’, especially with a view to tackle a possible 
lack of security within the territory of the Municipality.103 However, in 2011 
102  Article 42(2) of the TUEL states that: “The Council has a competence which is restricted 
to the following fundamental acts . . .” (for example, approval of the Statute, approval of 
plans and strategies of the local authority, conventions with other local authorities, etc.). 
The Council of State, First Division, in its Ruling No. 3894 of 21 October 2010, in Foro 
amministrativo, CDS 2010, 10, pp. 2249 ff., held that the competence of the Municipal 
Council is limited to the ‘fundamental acts of the local authority’, that is, acts outlining 
plans and policies, whilst all acts referring to the functions of governing bodies shall be 
left with the Municipal Executive. In a similar way cf. Administrative Court of Calabria, 
Catanzaro, First Division, Ruling No. 463 of 4 April 2011, in Foro Amministrativo, TAR 
2011, 4, p. 1392.
103  On this point see S. Villamena, ‘Le ordinanze di «ordinaria amministrazione» del Sindaco 
(spunti problematici)’, in Nuove autonomie , No. 2/3, 2009, pp. 637–673. Legal scholarship 
dealt with this issue extensively. See for example the special issue of the law journal Le 
Regioni, 2010, pp. 15–449, with 24 papers on this topic.
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the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional such a wide-ranging 
power of the Mayor to issue ordinances beyond situations of ‘urgency’ and 
‘exceptionality’.104 
8.6 The functions of local authorities
8.6.1 Diffi culty of the subject
The identifi cation of the administrative functions of the local authorities is 
quite a complex exercise. Such complexity originates from a few elements; the 
principal being the lack of a comprehensive regulation of the functions of the 
local authorities. Such lack has created a great deal of confusion and has caused 
confl icts between the different tiers of government around the allocation of a 
certain power; in a number of subject matters it is still unclear ‘who’ is 
supposed to do ‘what’.
The problem stems from the ‘poor’ quality of legislation on local govern-
ment and, more recently, also from the legal recognition of the principle of 
subsidiarity. The introduction of the principle of subsidiarity in the Italian 
legal order (see supra section 8.1.2 and section 8.2.2) further complicated the 
division of administrative competences between the different tiers of govern-
ment. The concept of subsidiarity by nature implies a ‘fl exible’ allocation of 
administrative functions. The law no longer attributes the functions to the 
Municipalities or the Provinces in a ‘rigid’ and ‘uniform’ way. On the con-
trary, the allocation of a function depends on the ‘adequacy’, that is, on the 
effi ciency, of the local authority.105 
As pointed out by legal scholar Luciano Vandelli,106 subsidiarity embraces, 
but it is not limited to, the concept of ‘proximity’. Accordingly, subsidiarity 
does not automatically imply that higher tiers of government have to transfer 
their administrative functions to the authorities which are closest to the 
citizens. Subsidiarity also implies that a local authority has to be able to 
implement the tasks and to achieve the objectives which it has received. 
Subsidiarity should be read in conjunction with the principle of ‘adequacy’; 
that is, the ‘closest’ local authority should be transferred an administrative 
function, only if it is able (that is, it is ‘adequate’) to perform it in a way which 
is effi cient and economic.107 
In the Italian legal order it is complicated to apply the principles of ‘sub-
sidiarity’ and ‘adequacy’, because the local authorities (especially the 
104  Cf. Constitutional Court Ruling No. 115 of 4 April 2011.
105  See for example Article 7(1) of Law No. 131 of 5 June 2003, entitled “Legal provisions for 
adapting the legal order of the Republic to the Constitutional Revision Act No. 3 of 18 
October 2001”. 
106  See L. Vandelli, Il Sistema delle autonomie, cited in f’note 1, p. 131.
107  See G. M. Salerno, L’effi cienza dei poteri pubblici nei principi dell’ordinamento costituzionale, 
Torino, Giappichelli, 1999.
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Municipalities) are very different from one another; for example, there are 
Municipalities with a few hundred and Municipalities with a few million 
inhabitants (cf. supra section 8.1.1). Therefore the implementation of the 
principle of subsidiarity requires a ‘differentiation’ in the allocation of the 
administrative functions between the local authorities belonging to a same 
‘tier of government’, in order to ensure that an administrative function is 
exercised in the best possible way. This makes it very diffi cult to specify 
which functions belong to a given tier of local government. The State (or 
regional) law should attribute the administrative functions on a ‘case-by-case’ 
basis, taking account of the specifi c characteristics (size and organisation) of 
each Municipality or Province.108 This is the essence of the principle of 
‘differentiation’.109 
The existence of Regions in the Italian legal order further complicates the 
allocation of administrative functions. In the subject matters falling within 
its legislative competence, a Region may choose to transfer a regional function 
to local authorities within the Region. However, other Regions could choose 
to keep the same function to themselves. As a result, each Italian Region 
could put in place a different scenario in relation to the number and the type 
of administrative functions devolved to local authorities.
In light of the above, it is impossible to provide a fully-fl edged framework 
of the allocation of administrative functions to Provinces and Municipalities. 
Such framework could only be provided by analysing the laws in force in each 
Italian Region. 
8.6.2 The functions of local authorities
Despite the aforementioned diffi culties, it is possible to provide a generic 
outline of the administrative functions which are traditionally attached to 
the local authorities. This is easier in relation to the Provinces, as Article 19 
of the TUEL lays down a list of ‘subject matters’ which (used to) fall within 
the remit of the Provinces. As mentioned above (see supra at section 8.5.5), 
the responsibilities of the Provinces have been recently modifi ed by the 
108  See L. Vandelli, Il Sistema delle autonomie, cited in f’note 1, p. 131. The author explains that 
“striking a balance among these criteria [subsidiarity, proximity, adequacy, and 
differentiation], and their practical implementation, is a task of the State or the regional 
law in accordance with their respective competence”.
109  The principle of differentiation is the opposite to the principle of uniformity. Article 118 
of the Constitution, by expressly recognising the principle of differentiation, denies any 
parallelism or correspondence between the different tiers of government and their 
functions. This implies that the landscape of the distribution of administrative functions 
varies according to time and geographical location in order to ensure the best possible 
execution of administrative action. Cf. E. Griglio, Principio unitario e neo-policentrismo. Le 
esperienze italiana e spagnola a confronto, Padova, 2009, p. 80. On this point see also M. 
Cammelli, ‘Amministrazione (e interpreti) davanti al nuovo Titolo V della Costituzione’, 
in Le Regioni, 2001, p. 1282.
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Government led by Mario Monti. However, within this section of the work, 
the remit of the Provinces will be described as it used to be prior to the ‘Monti 
reform’. Unlike for Provinces, neither the TUEL nor any other piece of State 
legislation outline with comparable clarity the ‘subject matters’ which fall 
within the scope of the competence of the Municipalities.
According to Article 19 of the TUEL the functions of the Provinces are: 
(a) land protection, protection of the environment, prevention of natural 
disasters; 
(b) maintenance and exploitation of water resources and sources of energy; 
(c) maintenance and exploitation of the cultural heritage; 
(d) roads and transport; 
(e) protection of fl ora and wildlife, protected areas and nature reserves; 
(f) hunting and fi shing in internal waters; 
(g) waste management, regulation of wastewater and of sounds’ or gases’ 
emissions; 
(h) healthcare services; 
(i) tasks relating to the organisation of public high schools, artistic education, 
vocational training, school buildings; 
(j) collection and analysis of data and technical or administrative assistance 
to (other) local authorities. 
This list of ‘subject matters’ does not cover the entire scope of the competences 
of the Provinces. State or regional law can actually attribute further 
competences to the Provinces in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. 
In order to add further details on the ‘functions’ of the local authorities, 
including those of the Municipalities, in the following part of this chapter 
section I will adopt the classifi cation proposed by Luciano Vandelli.110 He 
identifi ed three ‘comprehensive areas’ which match those outlined in the State 
legislation that transferred the administrative functions to the State and to 
the Regions, that is, mainly, the Decree of the President of Republic No. 616 
of 1977, Legislative Decree No. 112 of 1998, and the TUEL. These three 
‘comprehensive areas’ are: 
1 economic development and industrial activities; 
2 land, environment, infrastructures; 
3 services for the person and the community.
he fi rst area (economic development and industrial activities) includes: 
‘agriculture’, ‘woodland’, ‘craftsmen’, ‘energy’, ‘job market’, ‘trade’. In relation 
to ‘trade’, for example, the Municipalities are responsible for authorising the 
opening of new shops and for deciding the opening times for the sale of 
groceries and drinks. Important functions belong to the Provinces in the 
110  See L. Vandelli, Il sistema delle autonomie, cited in f’note 1, pp. 138–146.
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fi eld of ‘energy’; planning and authorising the creation of new power plants; 
monitoring the effi ciency of the existing power plants. The Provinces 
also have important responsibilities in the ‘job market’ fi eld; promoting the 
match of demand and supply of work; providing vocational guidance and 
training. 
The second area (land, environment, infrastructures) includes: ‘town plann-
ing’, ‘environment’, ‘roads’, ‘transport’. In the fi eld of ‘town-planning’, for 
example, one fi nds the adoption of the town-planning scheme by the Munici-
pality (namely, by the Municipal Council). In the same fi eld the Provinces 
have the power to adopt a provincial coordination plan (that is, a plan 
coordinating all town-planning schemes) and to monitor the correct imple-
mentation of the municipal town-planning schemes. In the fi eld of ‘transport’, 
the Municipalities have the task to adopt the road traffi c plan in towns and 
cities. In the same fi eld the Provinces plan the road-network outside towns or 
cities and regulate the driving schools. 
The third area (services for the person and the community) includes: ‘health 
protection’, ‘social services’, ‘education and support of schooling’, ‘cultural 
activities’. The Municipalities perform a major role in the fi eld of ‘social 
services’. This fi eld includes support of persons (or families) who are in need 
for economic or psychological assistance. In the same fi eld the Provinces play 
an important role in relation to ‘education and support of schooling’, and 
especially in relation to the maintenance of school buildings. 
It is submitted that new (State or regional) laws would be required in order 
to clearly defi ne the remit of the local authorities. 
8.6.3 The ‘networks’ for the exercise of the ‘functions’ and the 
supply of the ‘services’ of the local authorities
The performance of functions and the supply of services by an ‘association’ of 
local authorities is a problem widely debated in Italian law and politics. This 
problem is due to the existence of a large number of local authorities whose 
size is small. More specifi cally, the majority of the Italian Municipalities have 
very little population and territory. Mutatis mutandis the situation of the 
Provinces is similar to that of the Municipalities. 
This situation limits the ability of the local authorities to perform their 
tasks adequately. The TUEL devotes Articles from 30 to 35 to the ‘forms of 
association’, that is, to the arrangements that can be put in place to ensure the 
joint performance of local ‘functions’ and ‘services’. Article 30 regulates the 
‘Conventions’ (‘Convenzioni’), Article 31 the ‘Consortiums’ (‘Consorzi’), 
Article 32 the ‘Unions of Municipalities’ (‘Unioni di Comuni’). 
The objective pursued through these ‘forms of association’ is to ensure a 
cheaper and more effi cient performance of tasks which would normally fall 
within the remit of a single local authority. A classic form of joint administrative 
action of local authorities is the ‘convention’ between a few Municipalities for 
the appointment of a common Secretary of the Municipality (Segretario 
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Comunale). In this way, one Secretary of the Municipality provides his “legal 
and administrative assistance”111 to more than one Municipality.
Associations are typically set up in the fi eld of ‘waste management’ 
and ‘public transport’ (usually these ‘associations’ are in the form of a 
‘Convention’, Art. 30 TUEL, or of a ‘Consortium’, Art. 31 TUEL). An impor-
tant form of cooperation between different local authorities and different tiers 
of government is the cooperation for executing public works (roads or tele-
communication networks) which require “integral and coordinated action by 
Municipalities, Provinces and Regions” (“azione integrata e coordinata di 
Comuni, Province e Regioni”).112 
8.7 Establishment, territorial modifi cation and 
merger of Provinces and Municipalities
Both the Constitution and the TUEL contain provisions on the ‘establishment’ 
and the ‘transformation’ of Municipalities. In order to establish a new 
Municipality (or in order to modify the district or the name of a Municipality), 
Article 133(2) of the Constitution lays down two basic rules: fi rst, the 
competence belongs to the Region where the Municipality is located; second, 
the regional decision (in the form of a regional law) follows a “consultation 
with the populations involved”.
On several occasions the Constitutional Court had the opportunity to 
deliver its interpretation of the expression “populations involved” used at 
Article 133(2) of the Constitution. In a fi rst judgment the Court held that the 
required consultation should be limited to the “populations directly affected”, 
that is, the population residing in the portion of territory which is subject to 
transfer from a Municipality to another.113 More recently, the Court overruled 
its earlier jurisprudence and established that “the detachment from a Munici-
pality of a portion of its district, no matter the size, may have an impact on 
the interests of the entire Municipality and of its entire population”.114 In 
other words, according to the Court, the expression ‘populations involved’ 
includes also those people who do not live in the detached portion of territory, 
but who may still face any direct consequence from the detachment of part of 
the municipal district.115
The TUEL pursues the objective to prevent a further ‘disintegration’ 
(‘polverizzazione’, lit. ‘reduction to a powder’) of the Italian territory. Article 
15(1) of the TUEL stipulates that all new Municipalities shall have a minimum 
111  See Article 97 of the TUEL.
112  This is the ‘Program Agreement’ (‘Accordo di Programma’) of Article 34 of the TUEL.
113  Cf. Constitutional Court Ruling No. 453 of 27 July 1989.
114  Cf. Constitutional Court Ruling No. 94 of 7 April 2000.
115  On this topic see E. Leotta, Note minime sull’istituzione di nuovi Comuni in Sicilia: referendum 
parziale o totalitario?, in http://www.giustizia-amministrativa.it/documentazione/Leotta_
Istituzione_di_nuovi_comuni_in_Sicilia.htm. 
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of 10,000 inhabitants. This limit does not apply if the new Municipality is 
the result of a merger of two or more previously existing Municipalities. 
Special fi nancial benefi ts are allocated to those Municipalities which decide 
to merge. 
Article 132(2) of the Constitution regulates the case of one or more 
Municipalities (or Provinces) which request to be detached from a Region and 
incorporated in another (this phenomenon is known as ‘migration’ of local 
authorities). In such a situation the procedure is more complex than for the 
establishment of new Municipalities. First, a referendum is required which 
obtains the majority of the populations of the Municipality or Municipalities 
(or Provinces) concerned. Second, after the detachment has been approved by 
referendum, a State law is required for its fi nal approval. A recent example of 
‘migration’ is that of the Municipalities located in Alta Valmarecchia. Law 
No. 117 of 3 August 2009 authorised their migration from the Region 
Marche to the Region Emilia-Romagna. According to the Constitutional 
Court, the migration of local authorities is rooted in a right of local commu-
nities to self-determination.116 However, the recognition of this right seems to 
be in confl ict with the constitutional right of the Regions to preserve their 
cultural, political and social identity.117 
Changes in provincial boundaries and the institution of new Provinces 
within a Region are proposed by the Municipalities and require a State law 
passed after consultation with the Region concerned (cf. Art. 133(1) of the 
Constitution). The Constitution does not contemplate the merger or the 
suppression of Provinces. The lack of a specifi c procedure leads to believe that 
a Province can be suppressed only through the constitutional revision process 
of Article 138 of the Constitution.118 
8.8 The relations between the different tiers 
of government
8.8.1 The forms of coordination of the action of 
the different tiers of government
After the 1997–1998 Bassanini reform and the 2001 constitutional reform, 
the Italian system has become ‘polycentric’ (cf. supra section 8.1.2). A number 
of State competences have been transferred to the local authorities and, as a 
result, also the relations between the different tiers of government have 
116  Cf. Constitutional Court Ruling No. 334 of 10 November 2004.
117  See T. E. Frosini, Da una Regione a un’altra. Il percorso costituzionale dei comuni, in Federalismi.
it (www.federalismi.it), 20 January 2010.
118  Cf. B. Caravita, Abrogazione o razionalizzazione delle Province?, in Federalismi.it (www.
federalismi.it), 20 September 2006. A different opinion is held by M. Renna, Brevi 
considerazioni su province e altri enti “intermedi” o di area vasta, in http://www.astrid-online.
it/--le-trasf/Note-e-con/Renna_Area_vasta_15.9.06.pdf. 
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increased. This part of the paper will be devoted to the relations between State 
and local authorities and between Regions and local authorities. 
8.8.2 Relations between the State and the local authorities
In order to coordinate the action of the State with that of the local authorities, 
the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 2 July 1996 
instituted the State-Cities-Local Autonomies Conference (Conferenza Stato-
Città-Autonomie Locali). Originally, this Conference was built as a ‘permanent 
table for study and discussion’ aimed to favour the exchange of information 
and the resolution of problems between the State and the local authorities. 
Later, Legislative Decree No. 281 of 28 August 1997 reshaped the Conference 
as a more structured organisation.
Article 8 of Legislative Decree No. 281 regulates the composition of the 
Conference. It is composed of the President of the Council of Ministers (this 
is how the offi ce as Italian ‘Prime Minister’ is called), a few Ministers,119 the 
President of the National Association of Italian Municipalities (Associazione 
Nazionale Comuni Italiani, ANCI), the President of the Union of Italian 
Provinces (Unione Province d’Italia, UPI), six Presidents of Provinces nomi-
nated by UPI, fourteen Mayors nominated by ANCI, and, fi nally, representa-
tives of State bodies, of local authorities and of public institutions. 
The tasks of the Conference are listed at Article 9 (paragraphs 5–7) of 
Legislative Decree No. 281. Among those, there is the “study, information, 
and dialogue” relating to those general political guidelines which may affect 
the functions of the Provinces and of the Municipalities. This activity (“study, 
information, and dialogue”) is the basis for a coordination of the relations 
between the State and the local authorities. Indeed it gives the Conference the 
opportunity to issue informed opinions on how to best balance the interest of 
the State and those of the local authorities. The position of the Conference is 
legally ‘quasi-binding’; that is, an administrative measure which is in breach 
of an opinion issued by the Conference may be void on grounds of a ‘misuse of 
powers’ (‘eccesso di potere’, which derives from the ‘bad’, or ‘incorrect’ exercise 
of administrative discretion). It needs to be pointed out that the Conference, 
in addition to ‘administrative’ coordination (that is, the coordination of the 
administrative activities of the different tiers of government), also ensures 
‘political’ coordination between State and local authorities. 
Legislative Decree No. 281 instituted another organisation coordinating 
the action of the State with that of the other tiers of government. This organi-
sation is the Unifi ed Conference (Conferenza Unifi cata), which ‘merges’ the 
State-Cities-Local Autonomies Conference and the State–Regions Conference 
(Conferenza Stato–Regioni). The State–Regions Conference is a forum for 
119  The Minister of Interior (or the Minister for Regional Affairs), the Minister of Treasury, 
State Budget, and Economic Planning, the Minister of Finances, the Minister of Public 
Works, and the Minister of Health. 
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cooperation between the State and the Regions.120 It is apparent how the 
Unifi ed Conference has the role of bringing together all the different tiers of 
government under one ‘roof’, when there are issues that need to be discussed 
which affect all the tiers of government. 
It is thanks to the described ‘system of conferences’ that a dialogue between 
the representatives of the State and of the other tiers of government has 
become possible. This dialogue produced ‘agreements’ on various topics in 
accordance with the method of ‘loyal cooperation’ as developed by the 
Constitutional Court.121 The ‘system of conferences’ is not the only way in 
which a link between State and local government is established. In addition, 
there are also other bodies which ensure the link; the Civil Administration of 
the Department of Interior, the Economy Department, which is responsible 
for the funding of local authorities, and the Prefect. Over the last few years the 
role of the Prefect has become quite important,122 insofar as it performs tasks 
relating to the maintenance of public order and public security, and coordinates 
the action of the Local Offi ces of the State with that of the local authorities.123 
8.8.3 The relations between the Regions and the local authorities
In matters falling within the scope of their legislative competence, the 
Regions have the power to allocate the administrative functions to local 
authorities in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity (cf. supra section 
8.3.3). It is therefore understandable that a structured dialogue needs to take 
place also between the local authorities and the Regions.124 
Article 123 of the Constitution stipulates that each Region shall have a 
consultative body on relations between the Regions and local authorities; the 
Council of Local Authorities (Consiglio delle Autonomie Locali, CAL).125 
120  The State–Regions Conference is composed of the President of the Council of Ministers, 
the Presidents of the Regions and the Presidents of the Autonomous Provinces of Trento 
and Bolzano. According to the Italian Constitutional Court (Ruling No. 116 of 31 March 
1994) the State–Regions Conference is the privileged forum for the discussion and 
negotiation of policy between the State and the Regions.
121  Cf. F. Merloni, ‘La leale collaborazione nella repubblica delle autonomie’, in Diritto 
pubblico, 2002, p. 827 ff.
122  Cf. M. R. Ingenito, Il rappresentante dello Stato e della Conferenza permanente, in Federalismi.
it (www.federalismi.it), 8 April 2009.
123  On the coordination role of the Prefect cf. the Decree of President of the Republic No. 
180 of 3 April 2006.
124  On this topic see P. Bilancia (ed.), Modelli innovativi di governance territoriale. Profi li teorici e 
applicativi, Milano, 2011.
125  See T. Groppi, ‘Un nuovo organo regionale costituzionalmente necessario. Il Consiglio 
delle autonomie locali’, in Istituzioni del federalismo, 2001, No. 6, pp. 1057–1078; G. U. 
Rescigno, ‘Consiglio delle autonomie locali e Costituzione’, in Politica del diritto, 2003, 
pp. 243 ff.; M. Cosulich, ‘Il Consiglio delle autonomie locali come strumento di raccordo 
fra Regioni ed enti locali: un possibile modello?’, in R. Balduzzi (ed.), Annuario DRASD 
2010, Milano, 2010, pp. 117–135. 
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Regional Statutes and regional laws have implemented the constitutional 
provision relating to the CAL.126
It follows a summary of the contents common to most regional regulations 
of the CAL: 
• It consists of the Presidents of the Provinces and of the Mayors.
• It is a consultative body expressing ‘non-binding’ opinions on regional 
legislative bills relating to matters of local interest.
• In some Regions the CAL has the power to introduce a legislative bill 
before the Regional Council.
• It is a forum where ‘agreements’ and ‘understandings’ between Regions 
and local authorities from that Region can be achieved.
• In some Regions (for example, Emilia-Romagna and Lazio) the CAL can 
request the Region to challenge a State law before the Constitutional 
Court on grounds of a violation of the constitutional autonomy granted 
to the local authorities.
8.8.4 The control on the action of the local authorities
In this part of the paper on the relations between the different tiers of govern-
ment, it is appropriate to deal with the control on local authorities. Actually, 
the State and regional control on local authorities is a form of State or regional 
intervention on local authorities and has an infl uence on those authorities. 
Italian legal scholars distinguish three types of administrative activities: 
‘active’, ‘consultative’, and ‘control’ activities.127 The fi rst is the actual action 
of public authorities, that is, the action aimed to achieve the institutional 
goals of public authorities. The second is aimed to deliver opinions on propos-
als (for example, this is the case of the Conferences; cf. supra section 8.8.2). 
The third is a check of various profi les of the action carried out by public 
authorities. 
The control on the administrative action of local authorities formed the 
focus of the reforms of the 1990s and of the 2001 constitutional reform (cf. 
supra section 8.1.2). The part of the TUEL which was most affected by the 
2001 constitutional reform is that relating to the control on local authorities. 
After the reform several forms of control have been abolished due to their 
incompatibility with the constitutional reform. 
The constitutional basis of control is in Article 97 of the Constitution. 
According to this provision the administrative action is bound to abide by 
two fundamental principles: ‘effi ciency’ (‘buon andamento’) and ‘impartiality’ 
126  Cf. Regional Law of Calabria No. 1 of 1997; Regional Law of Liguria No. 13 of 2006; 
Regional Law of Piedmont No. 30 of 2006; Regional Law of Puglia No. 29 of 2006 and 
fi nally Regional Law of Sardinia No. 1 of 2005. On this topic see L. Vandelli, Il Sistema 
delle Autonomie Locali, cited in f’note 1, pp. 226–230.
127  See A. M. Sandulli, Manuale di diritto amministrativo, Napoli, 1989, pp. 589 ff.
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(‘imparzialità’). With specifi c reference to local authorities, another important 
provision was Article 130 of the Constitution, later repealed by the 2001 
constitutional reform. This Article stipulated that “In conformity with State 
law, a regional body exercises in a decentralised manner a control on the 
legality of the acts of the Provinces, of the Municipalities and of the other 
local authorities”. This ‘regional body’ was the Regional Control Committee 
(Comitato Regionale di Controllo, CORECO). With the repeal of Article 130 
also the provisions of the TUEL relating to the CORECO (Articles 126–136) 
were impliedly repealed.128 
Other forms of control on local authorities remain in place. The TUEL 
distinguishes three categories of control; on the ‘acts’, on the ‘organs’ and on 
‘administration’ (‘gestione’). 
The fi rst category (control on the acts) largely constituted a competence of 
the CORECO and was abolished by Article 130 of the Constitution. Within 
this category only the control provided at Articles 137 (“Government’s sub-
stitute powers”) and 138 (“Extraordinary annulment”) of the TUEL survived 
the 2001 constitutional reform. These forms of control were actually deemed 
compatible with that reform, as they are fully consistent with Article 120(2) 
of the Constitution.129 The element that the substitute power and the extraor-
dinary annulment have in common is that they are tools for the protection of 
the national interest in the context of a State in which a considerable number 
of administrative functions have been transferred to local authorities (Bassanini 
reform). When the local authorities fail to act, the national Government has 
the power to intervene through the substitute power, and when the local 
authorities adopt illegal acts, through the power of extraordinary annulment. 
These two powers counterbalance the enhanced role of the local authorities 
after the Bassanini reform. At the same time, in order not to diminish the 
constitutional status of the local authorities, these powers shall be exercised 
by the Government only in exceptional situations. This explains why the 
administrative courts have surrounded this power of a number of guarantees 
in favour of the local authorities. 
The second category (control on the organs) is regulated by Articles 
141–146 of the TUEL. This type of control mainly applies to the political 
organs of local authorities (for example, the Mayor and the President of the 
Province). In case a political organ is found responsible of serious violations 
128  A few rulings state that the abolition of the administrative control on local authorities is 
due to the principles of autonomy and subsidiarity provided by Article 118 of the 
Constitution. Cf. Regional Administrative Court of Abruzzo, Pescara, Ruling No. 302 of 
6 March 2003.
129  Under Article 137 of the TUEL the national Government can act for local authorities 
when it ascertains the inertia of the local authorities in performing their administrative 
functions, if from such inertia derives: the “non-compliance with the obligations 
stemming from membership in the EU”, or the “risk of a serious damage to the national 
interest”. The “extraordinary annulment” of an act by the Government (cf. Article 138 of 
the TUEL) pursues the objective to strike down illegal measures issued by local authorities.
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(for example, ‘acting in breach of the Constitution’ or ‘serious and repeated 
infringements of the law’), the person in offi ce can be suspended or removed 
by the Minister of Interior. Once again, in order to protect the constitutional 
status of local authorities, suspension and removal shall take place only in 
exceptional circumstances. 
The third category is the control on administration. This form of control 
can be further sub-divided into two sub-categories: ‘internal control’ (when 
the control activity is carried out internally, that is, within the local authority) 
and ‘external control’ (when the control activity is carried out by an external 
authority). The fi rst form of control (internal control) is the result of an evolu-
tion from the original pattern of a control of legality to the current pattern of 
control of the quality of the administration. The new type of control (control 
of the quality of the administration) does not focus on a single administrative 
measure but on ‘administration’ in general and assesses the results of admin-
istration.130 This new pattern of control draws inspiration from private com-
panies. The principal aim is to guarantee ‘effi ciency’ and ‘effectiveness’ of 
administrative action through a balanced relationship between ‘resources 
used’ and ‘results achieved’.
The second form of control (external control) fi nds its regulation at Article 
148 of the TUEL. According to this legal provision, the Court of Accounts 
(Corte dei Conti) carries out a control on the “sound fi nancial administration” 
of the local authorities and, more specifi cally, on the achievement of a “balanced 
budget” in relation to the Internal Stability Pact (between State and local 
authorities), and in relation to the constraints deriving from the EU.131
8.8.5 Other forms of control: popular action, class action, 
Civic Defender
Article 9 of the TUEL stipulates that “Each voter is entitled to fi le to court 
any lawsuit pertaining to the Municipality and the Province”. This right is a 
form of control by citizens (or, in broader terms, by the ‘people’) in support of 
a local authority. The citizen can actually act for a local authority which failed 
to take legal action and can bring a case before a court in the interest of that 
local authority. This is an exception to the general rule; that an applicant can 
only take legal action if he or she has a legal interest in doing so. The Council 
of State (the supreme judicial body in administrative matters) held that the 
described ‘popular action’ (‘azione popolare’) is a form of ‘acting for’ local 
authorities by the citizen. The action is actually “aimed to enforce the rights 
and interests of the [local] authority in case of inertia of its representatives”.132
130  See Articles 147, 196, 197, and 198 of the TUEL.
131  See Article 7, paragraph 7, of Law No. 131 of 5 June 2003. 
132  Cf. Council of State, Fifth Division, Ruling No. 2889 of 28 May 2001. More recent 
judgments are: Council of State, Fifth Division, Ruling No. 2457 of 29 April 2010, and 
Council of State, Fourth Division, Ruling No. 4130 of 9 July 2011.
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More recently, another legal remedy has been introduced; the ‘class 
action’ against the public administration.133 Like for the ‘popular action’, 
also the ‘class action’ is a tool for improving the quality of administration 
rather than a form of protection of the rights of the claimant citizens. 
This clearly emerges from Legislative Decree No. 198 of 20 December 
2009. Article 1 of the Decree states that the ‘class action’ shall pursue the 
objective to “restore the correct performance of a function or the correct 
provision of a service”. Along the same lines Article 1(6) of the Decree 
establishes that the citizens bringing a ‘class action’ before a court shall 
not be entitled to receive compensation. An interesting example of ‘class 
action’ is the action taken by a few associations of consumers, parents 
and pupils against the Department of Education (a branch of State administra-
tion) in relation to the ‘chicken coop classrooms’ (‘classi pollaio’); that is, 
those public schools’ classrooms with a number of pupils above the legal 
cap. The Administrative Court upheld the claim and ordered the Depart-
ment of Education (a branch of State administration) to comply with the 
legal cap.134
Another instrument for the control of the legality of the administrative 
action of Municipalities and Provinces is the Civic Defender (‘Difensore 
Civico’).135 Article 11 of the TUEL defi nes the ‘mission’ of the Civic Defender. 
His role is to ensure the ‘effi ciency’ and ‘impartiality’ of local administration 
by combating “abuses”, “malfunctions”, “defi ciencies”, and “delays” by the 
local authority (these are all manifestations of ‘maladministration’, which in 
Italian is called ‘cattiva amministrazione’). The TUEL does not provide any 
additional detail as to the role of the Civic Defender. The specifi c regulation 
of this organ is left with the Statutes and the regulations of the single 
Municipalities and Provinces. The Statute needs to regulate the election 
system, the eligibility criteria for the offi ce, the cases of incompatibility 
with the offi ce, and, especially, the ‘access’ to the Civic Defender by the 
citizens. 
In practice the most important ‘power’ of the Civic Defender is to warn the 
political organs of the Municipalities or of the Province (especially, the Mayor 
and the President of the Province) of any episodes of ‘maladministration’. This 
‘warning power’ promotes awareness of maladministration by the local 
authority and puts the local authority in a position to address the issue in a 
timely way (this phenomenon is known as ‘self-defence by an administrative 
133  Legislative Decree No. 198 of 20 December 2009, entitled “Implementation of Article 4 
of Law No. 15 of 4 March 2009, on legal remedies aimed to promote the effi ciency of 
public authorities and of providers of public services”.
134  Regional Administrative Court of Lazio, Roma, Third Division, Ruling No. 552 of 20 
January 2011.
135  On the Civic Defender in Italian and comparative perspective see S. Villamena, ‘Mediatore 
europeo e «buona amministrazione» (Profi li ricostruttivi della tutela del Mediatore 
europeo attraverso la buona amministrazione comunitaria)’, in A. Contieri et al. (eds), 
L’interesse pubblico tra politica e amministrazione, Vol. 2, Napoli, 2010, pp. 251–270. 
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authority’, ‘autotutela amministrativa’, which is when a public authority 
rectifi es a previous mistake). 
Being an organ of the local authority, the Civic Defender is theoretically 
able to check the administrative action ‘from inside’. His particular position 
may actually enable the Civic Defender to fl ag up serious episodes of malad-
ministration. The position of the Civic Defender is further strengthened (in 
principle) by his power to investigate a matter on his own initiative, without 
necessarily waiting for a complaint to be put by a citizen against the local 
authority.136 The potential strong role of the Civic Defender ‘scared’ most local 
authorities. Indeed, a few of them decided not to establish a Civic Defender at 
all, whilst others decided to limit his independence through a system of elec-
tion that links the Civic Defender to the majority party within the Municipal 
or the Provincial Council.137 
A recent development needs to be fl agged up. In order to cut the public 
spending, the national Parliament (by Law Approving the State Budget 
for 2010138, ‘Legge fi nanziaria per il 2010’) established that the Munici-
palities shall abolish the Civic Defender.139 However, the effects of this 
law are unclear as the cited Law did not expressly repeal (or amend) Article 11 
of the TUEL. According to some scholars the Municipalities, with the 
approval of the respective Region, may still decide to keep their Civic 
Defenders.140 
8.9 The associations of local authorities
Both the Provinces and the Municipalities created private associations141 with 
the task of representing their interests at national level. The Provinces are 
members of the Union of Italian Provinces (Unione Province d’Italia, UPI).142 
Its Statute (that is, the ‘constitutional charter’ of the association), at 
Article 4, lays out the aims of the UPI. Its principal aim is “to represent 
the Provinces vis-à-vis the Parliament, the Government and the other 
136  Article 11(1) of the TUEL. 
137  In almost all Municipalities and Provinces the Civic Defender is elected by the Municipal 
Council by absolute majority. It is not hard to guess that the majority party (or coalition 
of parties) will not normally elect an ‘enemy’. It is submitted that this possible lack of 
independence is the most signifi cant problem in relation to the Civic Defender.
138  Law No. 191 of 23 December 2009.
139  Article 2, paragraph 186, Lit. a), Law No. 191 of 23 December 2009. 
140  See E. Frediani, ‘La funzione di tutela procedimentale del difensore civico e degli istituti 
ad esso affi ni nella più recente legislazione regionale’, in Giurisprudenza italiana, 2011, pp. 
6 ff., who makes reference to two important regional pieces of legislation: Law of the 
Region Tuscany No. 19 of 27 April 2009 (“Regulation on the regional Civic Defender”), 
and Law of the Region Lombardy No. 18 of 6 December 2010 (“Regulation on the 
regional Civic Defender”).
141  As such, they are regulated in the Civil Code. 
142  With the sole exception of the Provinces of Trento, Bolzano, and Aosta. The offi cial web 
site of the UPI is http://www.upinet.it/upinet/province.bfr. 
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bodies of the State, as well as vis-à-vis the Community institutions . . . and 
the Regions”.
The majority of the Italian Municipalities (about 7,000) are members of the 
National Association of Italian Municipalities (Associazione Nazionale 
Comuni Italiani, ANCI).143 This association represents the interests of the 
Municipalities as a ‘tier of government’ at national level. According to Article 
1(4) of its Statute the ANCI nominates the representatives of the Municipalities 
within the State-Cities-Local Autonomies Conference (Conferenza Stato-
Città-Autonomie Locali) and within the Unifi ed Conference (Conferenza 
Unifi cata). 
8.10 Implementation of EU law at local level
Like any other public authority, the local authorities are bound to abide by 
EU law and are involved in their implementation and application within the 
domestic jurisdiction. In recent time this role of local authorities has grown 
signifi cantly due to a few new legislative innovations; the most important 
being the introduction of the subsidiarity principle in the Constitution. 
As previously stated (see supra section 8.2.2), this principle implies that the 
administrative functions need to be allocated preferably to those local authori-
ties which are closer to the citizen. As a result, a number of administrative 
functions, which are regulated by EU law, end up being performed at local 
level by Municipalities and Provinces.144 A few examples can be provided; 
‘local public services’, ‘public contracts’,145 ‘trade’ (especially in relation to 
aspects regulated by EU competition law). 
Article 137 of the TUEL provides that in case of inertia causing “non-
compliance with the obligations deriving from EU membership” the 
Government is entitled to use their substitute power and to act for the local 
authority.
Integration in the EU has pushed local authorities to establish ‘links’ 
between themselves and the EU institutions. A number of Municipalities 
have created ad hoc offi ces, whose role is to provide accurate information on 
EU policies affecting the local authority, and especially on funding made 
available by the EU.146
143  The offi cial web site of the ANCI is http://www.anci.it. 
144  See for example Article 1 of Law No. 241 of 7 August 1990 entitled “New rules on the 
decision-making process of administrative authorities and on the right of access to adminis-
trative documents”, according to which, after the constitutional reform introduced in 2005, 
“administrative action” shall be compliant with the following criteria “appropriate cost-
benefi t assessment, effectiveness, impartiality, publicity and transparency” (“economicità, di 
effi cacia, di imparzialità, di pubblicità e di trasparenza”), as well as with the “principles of 
the Community legal order” (“principi dell’ordinamento comunitario”).
145  Cf. Article 192 of the TUEL.
146  For example the Municipality of Bologna has created such an offi ce (http://www.iperbole.
bologna.it/europedirect/). 
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8.11 The reform of local government 
In Italy the reform of local government has been the subject of a vivid but not 
always very fruitful debate. For a long time, the opinion has been voiced that 
the Provinces should be suppressed.147 However, paradoxically, in the last few 
years the number of the Provinces has grown.148 In relation to this aspect 
something new happened following the arrival of the Monti Government in 
late 2011.
The main problem with the reform of Italian local government is that 
most proposals lack ‘vision’. Indeed, far from engineering a new system of 
local government, most proposals are mere attempts to tackle the economic 
crisis and to comply with EU-determined budget constraints. This is not a 
good method for reforming the system (haste makes waste!). A credible reform 
of local government demands a thorough debate in Parliament and in the 
country.
The reduction in the public sector’s expenditure is the real objective of all 
recent legislative interventions affecting local authorities.149 One example is 
the attempt to diminish the number of the Mountain Communities with the 
related aim to lower the State funding of these authorities.150 The Constitutional 
Court struck down this ‘mini-reform’ with the argument that the topic is not 
a State competence but a regional competence.151 
A second example is the recent reform of the Provinces.152 Faced with 
the political impossibility of suppressing the Provinces and with the 
absolute need for cutting their cost, the Monti Government (incumbent) 
147  See the legislative bill No. 1587 of 17 June 2009, available at http://www.senato.it/
leg/16/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/33740.htm. 
148  On this point, see S. Civitarese Matteucci, ‘La garanzia costituzionale della Provincia in 
Italia e le prospettive della sua trasformazione’, in Istituzioni del federalismo, 2011, pp. 467 
ff. 
149  See F. Merloni, ‘Il sistema amministrativo italiano, le Regioni e la crisi fi nanziaria’, in Le 
Regioni, 2011, p. 599 ff., and G. G. Carboni, ‘Il coordinamento dinamico della fi nanza 
pubblica negli ordinamenti decentrati, tra limiti costituzionali e vincoli economici’, in Le 
Regioni, 2011, pp. 605 ff. In order to overcome the problem of their debt, a number of 
local authorities have chosen to resort to derivative instruments of fi nance, that is, exactly 
those instruments that led many banks to bankruptcy. Law No. 448 of 28 December 2001 
allowed local authorities to issue bonds and to take loans. Quite often these ‘tools’ have 
not been used in a proper way. On this topic, see A. Luberti, ‘Strumenti fi nanziari derivati: 
legittime le limitazioni all’autonomia negoziale degli enti locali’, in Giurisprudenza itali-
ana, 2010, pp. 10 ff.; and S. Vesentini, ‘Il giudice civile si pronuncia sui derivati utilizzati 
dagli enti locali: l’up front nei contratti di Interest Rate Swap’, in Responsabilità civile, 
2010, 12, pp. 821 ff.
150  See Article 2, paragraphs 17–26, of Law No. 244 of 24 December 2007 (Budget-Setting 
Law for 2008, ‘Legge fi nanziaria per il 2008’). 
151  Constitutional Court Ruling No. 237 of 24 July 2009, No. 27 of 28 January 2010, and 
No. 91 of 21 March 2011. 
152  The reform is contained in the ‘Rescue Italy’ Decree (decreto ‘Salva Italia, Law Decree 
No. 201 of 6 December 2011, transposed into Law No. 214 of 22 December 2011). This 
reform also applies to the Provinces of the Regions with special autonomy.
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made the existing Provinces ‘lighter’, both in terms of responsibilities and 
organisation.153 
In terms of responsibilities, the Provinces shall now be attributed solely 
the functions relating to ‘direction and coordination’ (‘indirizzo e coordin-
amento’) of the activities of the Municipalities.154 In terms of organisation, 
the Provincial Executives (see supra section 8.5.5) have been suppressed,155 
the number of seats within the Provincial Council has been capped at ten,156 
and the President of the Province shall be elected by the Provincial Council 
among its members157 (whilst before the reform he was directly elected by 
citizens). In sum, the Provinces have been deprived of a large part of their 
authority.158
Law No. 42 of 5 May 2009, concerning primarily the implementation 
of Article 119 of the Constitution, has been the basis for the adoption 
of a number of legislative decrees (cf. supra section 8.5.4). The fi rst of 
them is the Decree allocating to Municipalities and Provinces, as well as 
Regions, real properties owned by the State.159 This decree was followed 
by the Decree conferring special autonomy to Rome as the capital city 
of Italy.160
Later, three legislative decrees were approved which can be traced back to 
the concept of ‘fi scal federalism’. The fi rst decree is concerned with the 
“Standard fi nancial needs of Municipalities and Provinces”.161 The second is 
concerned with the implementation of ‘fi scal federalism’ at the level of the 
153  However, the recent Decree Law No. 95 of 6 July 2012 (transposed into Law No. 135 of 
7 August 2012) paves the way to a possible reduction of the number of the Italian 
Provinces. Art. 17 and Art. 18 of the Decree stipulate that, through a series of measures 
passed at central and at regional level, the number of the Italian Provinces will be reduced. 
Only the larger Provinces (both in terms of territory and of population) will remain. The 
‘reshuffl e’ of the Italian Provinces should be completed by the end of 2013. It should lead 
to the survival of ‘only’ 51 Provinces in the 15 Regions with ordinary autonomy (slightly 
above the half of the current total number). No reduction is provided for the Provinces of 
the 5 Regions with special autonomy.
154  Art. 23, paragraph 14.
155  Art. 23, paragraph 15.
156  Art. 23, paragraph 16.
157  Art. 23, paragraph 17.
158  By 31 December 2012 both the State and the Regions will have to transfer to the 
Municipalities all those functions of the Provinces which are not ‘direction and 
coordination’ (cf. Article 23, paragraph 18). Should the Regions not execute the transfer 
on time, the State will be entitled to act for them (‘substitute power’ pursuant to Art. 8 
of Law No. 131 of 5 June 2003). 
159  Legislative Decree No. 85 of 28 May 2010. On this piece of legislation see A. Police, ‘Il 
federalismo demaniale: valorizzazione nei territori o dismissioni locali?’, in Giornale di 
Diritto Amministrativo, 2010, 12, p. 1233 ff., and A. Lezzi, ‘Federalismo demaniale. Prime 
rifl essioni sul decreto legislativo 28 maggio 2010, n. 85’, in Rivista giuridica dell’ambiente, 
2011, 2, p. 229.
160  Legislative Decree No. 156 of 17 September 2010.
161  Legislative Decree No. 216 of 26 November 2010.
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Municipalities.162 The third decree is concerned with the implementation of 
‘fi scal federalism’ at regional level and more specifi cally with the cut to public 
spending for the public healthcare system (which is mainly within the 
responsibility of the Regions).163 
More recently, three legislative decrees have been enacted relating to: 
1 provision of resources for the economic inequalities among the different 
areas of the country;164 
2 harmonisation of accounting methods and budgets of the Regions, 
Provinces, and Municipalities;165 
3 penalties and prizes for Regions, Provinces and Municipalities.166
Overall it emerges from all the mentioned new legislative acts that there is 
a trend towards the establishment of a system in which the local authori-
ties, instead of receiving all (or the major part of) their funding from the 
State, collect (at least part of) their own fi nancial resources within their 
own territory and community.167 For example, the aforementioned decree on 
the introduction of ‘fi scal federalism’ at the level of the Municipalities 
(Legislative Decree No. 23 of 14 March 2011) establishes at Article 2(1) that 
taxes on mortgages and rents relating to real properties located within 
their municipal district should be attributed to the Municipalities. By the 
same token, the same decree (cf. Article 4) allows the Municipalities to 
impose a “tax on temporary stay” on those people (mainly tourists) staying in 
hotels, bed & breakfast, etc. located within their district. The income from 
this tax should be used for funding interventions for promoting tourism, 
protecting the cultural heritage and the environment, or funding local public 
services. 
The implementation of the illustrated principle (enhancement of the 
fi nancial self-suffi ciency of the Municipalities) may lead to unacceptable 
inequalities in the provision of some basic public services (public schools, 
public healthcare, social welfare, etc.), if Municipalities (especially those from 
the South of Italy) are incapable of offering the same standard of services 
supplied in other (richer) areas of the country. However, the resignation in late 
2011 of the Berlusconi Government, which had proposed the introduction of 
‘fi scal federalism’ as an essential part of their political manifesto, and the 
162  Legislative Decree No. 23 of 14 March 2011.
163  Legislative Decree No. 68 of 6 May 2011.
164  Legislative Decree No. 88 of 31 May 2011.
165  Legislative Decree No. 118 of 23 June 2011.
166  Legislative Decree No. 149 of 6 September 2011.
167  On the topic of the sources of funding and the expenditures in the different Italian 
Regions see B. Baldi, ‘I “numeri” del federalismo fi scale: un confronto fra le Regioni’, in 
Istituzioni del federalismo, 2010, pp. 495 ff. See also S. Civitarese Matteucci, ‘Sistema 
regionale-locale e fi nanziamento delle autonomie’, in Istituzioni del federalismo, 2010, 
pp. 81 ff. 
25304_text.indd   228 18/03/2013   08:55
NO
T F
OR
 DI
ST
RIB
UT
IO
N
Italy  229
presence in offi ce of the Monti Government may well delay the implementation 
of ‘fi scal federalism’. 
In 2009, the (Berlusconi) Government prepared a legislative bill with the 
aim of determining the ‘fundamental functions’ of Municipalities and 
Provinces in accordance with Article 117(2), Lit. p, of the Constitution (see 
supra section 8.3.4). Article 2 of the bill identifi es 21 fundamental functions 
of the Municipalities, including “local public services”, “trade”, “town 
planning”, “roads”, “social services”, “school services”. Article 3 of the bill 
identifi es 19 fundamental functions of the Provinces, including “civil 
protection” (that is, protection against natural and man-made disasters), 
“environment”, “public transport”, “job centres and vocational training”. 
Last but not least Article 13 of the bill delegates the Government to adopt 
the “Charter of local autonomies” in order to “bring together and coordinate” 
all the State laws on local government. The legislative bill (dated 19 
November 2009) has been thoroughly examined by parliamentary com-
mittees but has not yet become law.168 However, as previously stated (cf. 
f’note 56), Article 19 of the Decree Law No. 95 of 6 July 2012 contains the 
fi rst legal enumeration of the ‘fundamental functions’ of the Municipalities.
In January 2012, the Government led by Mario Monti approved the ‘Decree 
on the liberalisations’ (‘decreto sulle liberalizzazioni’),169 which aims to 
establish competition in a few economic sectors traditionally administered by 
the Municipalities; for example, the issue of taxi licences (Article 36), and the 
sale of newspapers and magazines (Article 17, paragraph 4).
8.12 Conclusion
Since the coming into effect of the Constitution of 1948, the local authorities 
have gained a signifi cant political and legal status. However, the Italian 
system could implode due to the plethoric number of public bodies, including 
over 8,000 Municipalities.
Good administration is extremely diffi cult to provide in a system with so 
many Municipalities and in which very big Municipalities (with a few million 
inhabitants) co-exist with very little Municipalities (with only a few hundred 
inhabitants). Certainly, the introduction in the Constitution of a principle as 
controversial as subsidiarity did not help determine a clear allocation of 
responsibilities between the different tiers of government.
168  Articles 2 and 3 of the Government’s legislative bill dated 19 November 2009 containing 
“Identifi cation of the fundamental functions of Municipalities, Provinces and Metropolitan 
Cities, simplifi cation of the legislation on the Regions and on the local authorities, and 
delegation to the Government of the transfer of administrative functions [to local 
authorities], [of the implementation] of the Charter of Local Autonomies, and of the 
rationalisation of the Provinces and of the local offi ces of the Government. Reorganisation 
of public authorities and decentralised institutions”. 
169  Decree Law No. 1 of 24 January 2012 “Urgent provisions on competition, development 
of the infrastructures and competitiveness”.
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Because the number of Municipalities remains so high and the Municipalities 
are so different from one another in terms of inhabitants, resources, personnel, 
etc., it will be very diffi cult to pass a comprehensive and coherent reform of 
municipal government. 
A possible solution could be to oblige the Municipalities to merge or to 
associate in order to manage their functions in a more effi cient and economical 
way. This objective can be achieved through the provision of fi nancial 
incentives; for example, by granting extra-funding to those Municipalities 
which decide to merge and by reducing the funding of those Municipalities 
which refuse to do so.
The Government’s policy to reduce public expenditures deserves a positive 
evaluation. However, until now, the Government’s initiatives have affected 
only the Provinces (as well as the citizens, via higher direct and indirect 
taxation) and not the Municipalities. It appears that the reform of local 
authorities in Italy fi nds a nearly insurmountable obstacle in the traditionally 
strong municipal tier of government, which cannot be easily reduced or 
cancelled.
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